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PARENTAL-STATUS EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
A WRONG IN NEED OF A RIGHT?
Peggie R. Smith*
This Article evaluates strategies to challenge employment discrimination based on
parental status. Specifically, it examines proposals put forth by some commentators
to establish parental status as a protected class. While such a suggestion is attrac-
tive, the Article argues that it ultimately offers few practical advantages and
remains wedded to a limited conception of equality, requiring only that employ-
ment decisions not reflect differences based on parenthood. Consequently, such a
strategy would satisfy anti-discrimination legislation so long as both men and
women with parental obligations are equally ill-treated. The Article concludes that
a shift in perspective from gender to parental status 1iill not foster meaningful
change in the situation of working parents without a parallel shift in legal strate-
gies to resolve work-family conflicts. The model must change from one of formal
equality to one that requires the workplace to accommodate the parenting obliga-
tions of workers.
INTRODUCTION
Employees with parental responsibilities face enormous chal-
lenges trying to balance the demands of child care with the
pressures of work.' Caught in a workplace culture that accords little
value to parenting,2 working parents must struggle to nurture and
provide for their children. Few individuals are employed in job set-
tings that afford the necessary flexibility to respond adequately to
the "predictable unpredictability" of childrearing.3 As a result,
many working parents labor under constant stress, worried about a
"parental time famine" and concerned that they are compromising
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.A., Yale University, 1987; M.A.,
Yale University, 1990; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1993. I am grateful to my colleagues who
gladly gave of their time to provide comments on this Article. They include Katherine Baker,
Howard Eglit, Rafael Gely, Hal Krent, Martin Malin, and Margaret Stewart.
1, See SYLVIA A. HEWLE'1I-r & CORNEL WEST, THE WAR AGAINST PARENTS 29-30
(1998); S. JODY HEYMANN, THE WIDENING GAP (2000); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GEN-
DER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT (2000) [hereinafter
WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER].
2. See HEWLETr & WEST, supra note 1, at 153 (observing that "contemporary Ameri-
can culture has become profoundly antagonistic toward parents").
3. See HEYMANN, THE WIDENING GAP, supra note 1, at 15-31 (describing how the
"predictably unpredictable" nature of caring for children leads to constant work disruptions
and runs counter to the assumption of most workplaces that workers will perform in an
uninterrupted fashion).
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the care of their children.4 To help parents achieve a satisfactory
medium between work and family, lawmakers have pursued various
strategies, including prohibiting employment discrimination
against individuals based on their parental status.
Proposals to treat parenthood as a protected category-similar
to race and sex-reflect a concern that parents are vulnerable to
inaccurate assumptions and negative stereotypes about their career
potential and job commitment, and that they encounter
work/family conflicts more frequently than individuals without
children. Although there are a few statutes that prohibit parental-
status-based employment discrimination, in most jurisdictions em-
ployers can freely discriminate against employees based on such
status. Commentators point to cases like that of Diane Piantanida
to support extending the scope of fair employment laws to specifi-
cally include protection for employees with parental obligations.7
Ms. Piantanida, a new mother, claimed that she was demoted be-
cause her employer felt that her previous position was ill-suited for
new mothers. s The employer allegedly offered her a position that
was more appropriate "'for a new mom to handle."' 9 Affirming a
lower court's dismissal of Ms. Piantanida's discrimination suit
against the employer, the Eighth Circuit observed that while dis-
crimination based on one's status as a parent was "reprehensible,"
it was not actionable under federal law.10
4. HEWLETT & WEST, supra note 1, at 216 (concluding that "parents' central and in-
creasingly desperate concern revolves around a time crunch"); id. at 232-33. See generally
ARLIE RUSSELL HoCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND HOME
BECOMES WORK 124-25 (1997) (exploring the impact of the "time bind" on the ability of
workers to care for their families).
5. Throughout this Article, the term "parent" is used to encompass individuals with
parental obligations. The Article defines "parent" in accordance with proposed federal legis-
lation to prohibit employment discrimination against parents. Ending Discrimination
Against Parents Act, S. 1907, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999). Under the proposed legislation,
"parent" refers to biological parents, adoptive parents, foster parents, stepparents, custodi-
ans of a legal ward, individuals in loco parentis who stand vis-d-vis such an individual, and
individuals actively seeking legal custody or adoption. The proposed legislation further de-
fines parent to include individuals who have parental relationships with people under the
age of eighteen or people unable to take care of themselves due to mental or physical dis-
ability. Id. § 4(k); see also infra Part II.A (discussing the proposed Ending Discrimination
Against Parents Act). When referring to parents, I use the concepts of parental obligations
and parental responsibilities interchangeably with child care obligations and child care
responsibilities.
6. See infra notes 92-102 and accompanying text (listing local ordinances and state
statutes that prohibit employment discrimination based on parental status).
7. Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 E3d 340 (8th Cir. 1997).
8. Id. at 340.
9. Id. at 341.
10. Id. at 342.
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Occurrences of parental-status-based discrimination are often
gender-related and are therefore subject to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.11 Title VII's comparative approach to sex equal-
ity, however, does not effectively address discriminatory workplace
obstacles that hinder the employment opportunities of individuals
with parental obligations. 12 While detrimental to both men and
women with parental responsibilities1 3 Title VII's shortcomings are
particularly pronounced with respect to working mothers who, as
childbearers and primary caretakers of children, are more likely to
experience parental-status-based employment discrimination than
men.' 4 Based on formal equality principles, Title VII requires that
individuals who are alike should be treated alike; in the context of
gender, this means that women must be treated the same as men
only if they are similarly situation with men.'5 While appealing in
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2001).
12. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1226-33 (1989) [hereinafter Abrams, Gender Discrimination];
Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination
Analysis in Reconstructing the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79, 143 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Dowd, Gender Paradox]; Maxine N. Eichner, Square Peg in a Round Hole: Parenting Policies
and Liberal Theory, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 133, 139-40 (1998); see also infra notes 37-64 and ac-
companying text (examining Title VII's effectiveness in eliminating discrimination against
workers with parental obligations).
13. Although work/family conflicts have long been regarded as a woman's issue,
scholars are increasingly examining the impact of such conflicts from the perspective of
fathers. SeeJAMES A. LEVINE & TODD L. PrrrINSKY, WORKING FATHERS: NEW STRATEGIES FOR
BALANCING WORK AND FAMILY (1997); Nancy E. Dowd, Rethinking Fatherhood, 48 FLA. L. REv.
523 (1996); Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REv.1047 (1994); Martin
H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave Revisited, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 25 (1998); Keith Cun-
ningham, Note, Father Time: Flexible Work Arrangements and the Law Firm's Failure of the Family,
53 STAN. L. REv. 967 (2001).
14. See DAPHNE SPAIN & SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, BALANCING ACT: MOTHERHOOD, MAR-
RIAGE, AND EMPLOYMENT AMONG AMERICAN WOMEN (1996).
15. See GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 101 (Katherine T. Bartlett
& Angela P. Harris eds., 2d ed. 1998):
Formal equality is a principle of equal treatment: individuals who are alike should be
treated alike, according to their actual characteristics rather than stereotypical as-
sumptions made about them. It is a principle that can be applied either to a single
individual, whose right to be treated on his or her own merits can be viewed as a right
of individual autonomy, or to a group, whose members seek the same treatment as
members of other, similarly situated groups. What makes an issue one of formal equal-
ity is that the claim is limited to treatment in relation to another, similarly situated
individual or group and does not extend beyond same-treatment claims to any de-
mands for some particular, substantive treatment.
See also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989)
[hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY] (critiquing the theory of formal equality);
Katherine T Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1 (1994) (distinguishing
among different feminist perspectives including formal equality, substantive equality,
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principle, this approach to equality ignores critical gender-based
biological distinctions as well as important socioeconomic dispari-
ties between men and women.' 6 Because women typically shoulder
primary parenting responsibilities, the denial of these differences
often leaves them without adequate legal recourse to redress work-
place discrimination.
Against that background, some commentators believe that a dis-
crimination baseline associated with parenting, rather than gender,
might better aid all working parents and especially working moth-
ers." Such a change promises to secure a measure of equality for
women, as parents, without requiring them to engage in compari-
sons with men, as parents. In this Article, I appraise the strength of
that promise. I argue that, while theoretically attractive, the prom-
ise of associating discrimination with parental status is largely
illusory, offering few practical advantages. Although a parental-
status-based approach to discrimination stands to promote a gen-
der-neutral understanding of child care, and in the process, to
advance the interests of all workers with parental obligations,' such
an approach remains wedded to a limited conception of equality,
requiring only that employment decisions not reflect differences
based on parenthood. Consequently, anti-discrimination legislation
is satisfied so long as both women and men with parenting obliga-
nonsubordination theory, different voice theory, and postmodern feminism); Mary Becker,
The Sixties Ship to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument for Pragmatism and Politics, 40
WM. & MARY L. REv. 209 (1998) (describing both the disadvantages and the advantages of a
formal equality approach to eliminating gender discrimination).
16. See Nancy E. Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex Differences into Account, 54 FORDHAM
L. REv. 699 (1986) [hereinafter Dowd, Maternity Leave]; Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N.
Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's
Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 513 (1983); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988).
17. See Special White House Briefing Subject: White House Conference on Teenagers and Presi-
dent's Upcoming School Reform Tour, FEDERAL NEWS SERV., May 2, 2000 (announcing measure
to prohibit federal government from discriminating against workers based on parental
status); Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 375, 509-10 (1996) (argu-
ing in favor of legislation to create "a special class of worker-the parent-who would be
protected from discrimination in hiring and terms of employment by virtue of her parental
responsibilities"); Sylvia Ann Hewlett, This Nation Simply Has To Do Better by Its Parents, Hous-
TON CHRONICLE, June 05, 2000, at 19 (arguing in favor of prohibiting employment
discrimination against parents); Mary Leonard, Plan for Parents' Rights Opens a Domestic Di-
vide, BOSTON GLOBE, April 25, 1999, at Al (noting groups that endorse legislation to
prohibit employers from discriminating on the basis of parental status); Bruce Reed, Working
Parents Unprotected, USA TODAY, April 22, 1999, at 14A (explaining why working parents need
protection from employment discrimination); Ruth Rosen, A Gift That Honors Moms and
Families, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 1999, at M5 (calling for anti-discrimination protection to be
extended to working parents).
18. See infra Part II.B (discussing the advantages of a parental-status-based discrimina-
tion paradigm).
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tions are equally ill-treated. I conclude that a shift in perspective
from gender to parental status will not foster meaningful change in
the situation of working parents without a parallel shift in legal
strategies to resolve work/family conflicts. The model must change
from one of formal equality to one that requires the workplace to
accommodate the parenting obligations of workers.
Not only does treating parents as a protected class lack
transformative power, it also raises concerns about the scope of
anti-discrimination doctrine. Arguments to prohibit employers
from discriminating against parents run counter to traditional anti-
discrimination employment measures. When compared with the
data regarding racial or gender discrimination, for example, the
evidence does not exist to indicate that employment
discrimination against parents based on erroneous assumptions is a
serious problem. Although critical of efforts to classify parents as a
protected class, I respect the motivating desire behind such efforts
to lessen work-parenting tensions. Thus, the ensuing analysis, while
focusing on the pitfalls of a parental approach to employment
discrimination, also briefly examines alternative approaches that
will enable working parents to better integrate child care
responsibilities with work.
The remainder of this Article is divided into five Parts. Part I ex-
amines the extent to which a prohibition against gender-based
employment discrimination can help working parents address
work/family conflicts. Part II evaluates the merits of existing and
proposed legislation to classify parents as a protected class. Part III
focuses on the structural inadequacies of a parental-status-based
approach to employment discrimination, and maintains that al-
though the approach stands to benefit some litigants, it lacks the
capacity to effect substantive change. Part IV borrows from equal
protection jurisprudence to consider the appropriateness of treat-
ing parents as a protected class. Finally, Part V discusses legal
strategies that seem more capable of helping parents resolve
work/family conflicts.
I. PROTECTION AGAINST PARENTAL STATUS DISCRIMINATION:
BENEFITS AND BARRIERS OF TITLE VII's
GENDER DISCRIMINATION MODEL
This Article uses Title VII's guaranty of gender-based equal pro-
tection as a comparative benchmark to explore the merits of a
SPRING 2002]
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parental-status-based approach to employment discrimination.
Title VII bars employers from discriminating on the basis of race,
color, sex, religion, and national origin.'9 While Title VII does not
specifically include parental status as a protected category, parents
are afforded some protection when discrimination based on paren-
tal status is coupled with one of the Act's prohibited factors, most
commonly sex.
To understand the appeal of legislation to prohibit employers
from discriminating against workers based on parental status, one
must first appreciate how allegations of parental status
discrimination presently fare when treated as problems of gender.
Thus, this Part examines the ability of a gender-based approach to
employment discrimination to redress discrimination against
individuals based on their status as parents. Part L.A probes the
strengths and limitations of a disparate treatment claim to
occurrences of parental status discrimination; Part I.B focuses on
the potential of the disparate impact paradigm to counteract
neutral practices disadvantaging workers with parental
responsibilities. The critical difference between a disparate
treatment claim and a disparate impact claim hinges on intent.
Whereas the former requires a showing of intent to discriminate,'
the latter refers to employment practices that are "fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation." To establish a disparate impact
claim, a plaintiff does not have to prove discriminatory intent, but
only that an employment practice "fall [s] more harshly on one
group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.22
Before turning to Part I.A, it is useful to distinguish among three
different ways in which individuals may experience employment
discrimination because of their status as parents. First, discrimina-
tion can occur as a result of employer stereotypes and assumptions
about individuals with parental obligations. For example, an em-
ployer may disfavor parents because he or she believes that workers
with children are less reliable than workers without children. Sec-
ond, discrimination against parents may reflect the fact that
individuals with children have parental obligations that can pre-
vent them from meeting all the demands of the workplace. To
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2001).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
21. See, e.g., Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977) (articulating differences between disparate impact and disparate treatment claims);
see also HAROLD S. LEWISJR., CIVIL RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 217-18
(1997).
22. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
23. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
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illustrate, an employment policy that ties upper-level promotions to
weekend work availability may discriminate against parents because
of their child care-related responsibilities. Third, parental-status-
based discrimination may be linked to biological differences be-
tween men and women. For example, the parenting rights of
women as mothers are often implicated by employment practices
that discriminate on the basis of pregnancy or breastfeeding. While
this third form of discrimination is specific to women only, both
men and women may experience the first two forms of discrimina-
tion.
A. Disparate Treatment
Employees have had some success using Title VII to challenge
discrimination based on parental status when an employer relies
upon gender stereotypes to differentiate among parents. Courts
have recognized that a Tide VII disparate treatment claim may
arise when an employer discriminates against an individual based
on "sex plus" another characteristic, such as parental status. 24 Phil-
lips v. Martin Marietta Corp. 25 presents the classic illustration of the
sex-plus doctrine in a case involving parenting. Ms. Phillips accused
her employer of discriminating against a subclass of women by hir-
26ing men, but rejecting women, with pre-school age children. In
ruling for Phillips, the Supreme Court held that it was illegal for an
employer to treat employees differently where the employer used
sex plus a second characteristic, such as marital or parental status.
27
The plaintiff in Trezza v. The Hartford, Inc.2s also fared well in in-
voking the sex-plus framework. Ms. Trezza, a married mother of
24. See Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1335 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citing Phil-
lips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971)) (recognizing that a Title VII claim
"may arise if an employer discriminates against an individual because of sex plus another
characteristic, such as marital or parental status"); Smith v. AVSC Int'l, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d
302, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that the sex plus "doctrine recognizes that it is impermissi-
ble to treat men with an additional characteristic more or less favorably than women with
the same additional characteristic"); see also BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 403 (2d ed. 1983) (observing that "sex plus" discrimination
occurs when an employer classifies employees on the basis of sex plus another characteris-
tic); Martha Chamallas, Exploring the "Entire Spectrum" of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII:
Rules Governing Predominantly Female Jobs, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9-17 (discussing the history
of the sex-plus doctrine).
25. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
26. Id. at 543.
27. Id. at 544.
28. No. 98 Civ. 2205 (MBM), 1998 WL 912101, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998).
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two young children, worked for Hartford as an attorney. In 1997,
29
she applied for a promotion to the position of managing attorney.
Hartford, however, did not consider Trezza for the position, assum-
ing instead that she would not be interested because of her family
. .. 30
responsibilities. The company instead offered the job to two men,
both of whom had children. 1 When the men declined the posi-
tion, Hartford eventually gave it to a woman who had less legal
experience than Trezza, but had no children.2 In her Title VII suit,
Trezza alleged that her status as a "woman and a parent" led toS 33
Hartford's failure to consider her for the promotion. The trial
court denied Hartford's motion for summary judgement, reason-
ing that Trezza's allegation that Hartford treated women with
children less favorably than men with children was sufficient to es-
tablish a prima facie case of sex-plus discrimination. 4
Phillips and Trezza both support the proposition that an em-
ployer cannot rely upon gender-based stereotypes about the
productivity of workers with children to treat a subclass of women
with parental responsibilities less favorably than a subclass of men
with parental responsibilities. Of course, as the following discus-
sion illustrates, a claim of sex plus parental status often hinges on
the presence of a corresponding subclass of members of the oppo-
35site gender to use as a comparison group.
Anti-discrimination statutes like Title VII, which do not treat
parenthood as a distinct protected class, are ineffective if plaintiffs
29. Id. at *2.
30. Id. at *2. Defendants allegedly made a number of derogatory comments to Trezza
including the statements "'women are not good planners, especially women with kids' " and
"'I don't see how you can do eitherjob well' " [i.e., being a mother and a worker]. Id. at *2.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at *5. Trezza also filed claims for hostile work environment sexual harassment,
disparate impact discrimination, discriminatory retaliation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Id. at *3.
34. Id. at *6-*7; see also In re Consol. Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582
F.2d 1142, 1144-45 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that TWA's policy, which required female flight
attendants who became mothers to accept employment in ground duty positions or to face
termination, but did not apply to male flight attendants who became fathers, constituted
unlawful discrimination against mothers under Title VII based on their status as women with
parental responsibilities); Pullar v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 701, 582 N.w.2d 273, 277-78 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that plaintiffs claim of discrimination under the Minnesota
Human Rights Act survived a motion to dismiss because it stated a claim of sex plus familial
status discrimination).
35. Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, Litigating Against Employment Penalties For Preg-
nancy, Breastfeeding and Childcare, 44 VILL. L. REv. 355, 363 (1999) ("Disparate treatment can
often be proved by comparing an employer's treatment of one sex with the treatment of the
other sex. A lack of a comparison group, however, will not necessarily defeat a claim of dis-
crimination because of the system of presumptions established by the United States
Supreme Court.").
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fail to establish that parents of the opposite sex received more
favorable treatment. For example, in Bass v. Chemical Banking
Corp.,36 the plaintiff, a married mother of two young children,
claimed that her former employer denied her a promotion based
on her gender plus either her marital status or her parental
status. 7 The claim relied on the fact that the promotion went to an
unmarried woman with no children.38 The court dismissed the
claim, concluding that the plaintiff had offered no evidence to es-
tablish that the employer had "treated her differently than married
men or men with children.0 9 The court added that, at most, the
employer may have discriminated against married persons or per-
sons with children, acts that fell outside Title Vii's protections.40
The inadequacy of a gender-based comparative approach to
tackle work-parenting difficulties is particularly glaring in cases that
involve gender-determined biological differences such as breast-
feeding and pregnancy. For example, in Martinez v. NBC,41 the
plaintiffs discrimination claim alleged that her employer demoted
her after she complained about inadequate accommodations for her
to pump breast milk for her newborn child.4 ' The court implied
that for the plaintiff to state a claim of sex-plus discrimination she
had to establish that the employer had treated her differently than
a similarly-situated man, namely, a hypothetical breastfeeding
43
man. The sheer impossibility of this requirement was not lost on
the court, which noted that "there is and could be no allegation
"4that Martinez was treated differently than similarly situated men.
Thus, the employer's breastfeeding policy did not discriminate be-
tween men and women, but between breastfeeding employees and
36. No. 94 Civ 8833, 1996 WL 374151 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1996); see also Fuller v. GTE
Corp., 926 E Supp. 653, 656 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (dismissing plaintiff's discrimination claim
based on "her status as a mother of young children," observing that she had failed to dem-
onstrate a difference in treatment between her and men with young children).
37. Bass, 1996 WL 374151, at *5.
38. Id. at *6. Plaintiff also alleged that, following the birth of her child, the employer
excluded her from "important industry meetings" and took "major responsibilities" away
from her. Id. at *1.
39. Id. at *5.
40. Id.; see also Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting
that discrimination based on parental status is not actionable under federal law).
41. 49 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y 1999).
42. Id. at 308.
43. Id. at 310.
44. Id. at 310-11.
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non-breastfeeding employees, 45 a distinction beyond the scope of
Title VII's prohibitions.
The Martinez court based its decision on General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert.46 In Gilbert, the Supreme Court held that General Electric's
disability plan, which excluded coverage of pregnancy-related dis-
abilities, did not discriminate on the basis of sex 47 because the plan
divided employees into two groups: pregnant women and non-
pregnant persons.48 Accordingly, this division was not gendered
because, "[w] hile the first group is exclusively female, the second
includes members of both sexes."4 9 In 1978, Congress amended
Title VII by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), °
which partially overruled Gilbert. The PDA establishes that dis-
crimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions is,.by definition, a form of illegal sex discrimination un-
der Title VII.5' However, the PDA only nullified Gilbert with respect
45. See Henry Wyatt Christrup, Litigating a Breastfeeding and Employment Case in the New
Millennium, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 263, 282 (2000) (concluding that every court to decide
whether Title VII protects employers from discriminating against breastfeeding women has
"conceiv[ed] of the two relevant classes as breastfeeding workers and non-breastfeeding
workers"). For other useful scholarship examining judicial treatment of workplace discrimi-
nation based on breastfeeding, see Diana Kasdan, Reclaiming Title VI and The PDA:
Prohibiting Workplace Discrimination Against Breastfeeding Women, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 309 (2001);
Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 35; Isabelle Schallreuter Olson, Out of the Mouths of Babes: No
Mother's Milk for U.S. Children, The Law and Breastfeeding, 19 HAMUNE L. REV. 269 (1995);
Jendi B. Reiter, Accommodating Pregnancy and Breastfeeding in the Workplace: Beyond the Civil
Rights Paradigm, 9 TEx.J. WOMEN & L. 1 (1999); Corey Silberstein Shdaimah, Why Breastfeed-
ing Is (Also) a Legal Issue, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 409 (1999).
46. 429 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1976).
47. For insightful analyses of Gilbert, see Lucinda Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A
Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986); Herma Hill
Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985).
48. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135.
49. Id.
50. Title VII was amended to prohibit discrimination based on pregnancy after the
Supreme Court held in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert that pregnancy discrimination was not
based on gender. The amended statute provides that:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits
under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be in-
terpreted to permit otherwise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2001).
51. Id.; see also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684
(1983) ("The Pregnancy Discrimination Act has now made clear that, for all Title VII pur-
poses, discrimination based on a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because
of her sex.").
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to pregnancy.52 Consequently, Gilbert continues to control cases
dealing with gender biological differences other than pregnancy-
related conditions.53
Unfortunately, the obstacles posed by a formal equality-based
approach to gender discrimination remain even in cases that fall
firmly within the scope of the PDA, as evident in Troupe v. May
Department Stores.54 In Troupe, a pregnant employee was terminated
from her job the day before her scheduled maternity leave.55 Prior
to the termination, Ms. Troupe reported late to work on several
occasions because of severe morning sickness.56 Troupe filed suit
under the PDA, arguing that May fired her because it feared she
would not return from maternity leave. 57 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the claim.5 Writing for the
court, Judge Posner reasoned that the termination did not run
afoul of the PDA because " [e] mployers can treat pregnant women
as badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant
52. See Christrup, supra note 45, at 276 (noting that "the lower courts have interpreted
the PDA as rejecting Gilbert as it relates to 'pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical condi-
tions,' but continue to treat the reasoning of Gilbert as controlling law with respect to all
other forms of discrimination that can only be visited on a subset of women, and not on
men."); Kasdan, supra note 45, at 310 (noting the continued influence of Gilbert in breast-
feeding cases); Reiter, supra note 45, at 6 ("For lack of a better paradigm, Gilbert continues to
dictate the conceptual scheme that some courts use to evaluate civil rights claims concern-
ing employer accommodation of breastfeeding, even though it has been widely recognized
that Gilbert was superseded by the PDA.").
53. See Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1491-92 (D. Colo. 1997) (con-
cluding that breastfeeding is not covered by Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act); see also McNill v. N.Y. City Dep't of Corr., 950 E Supp. 564, 569-71
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867,869 (W.D. Ky. 1990), affd, 951
F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991). For a critique of judicial decisions failing to extend the PDA to
breastfeeding, see Olson, supra note 45, at 302-03 (maintaining that breastfeeding should
be regarded as a "medical condition" for. purposes of PDA analysis). But see Kovacic-
Fleischer, supra note 35, at 380-83 (concluding that breasffeeding does not fit the medical
"disability" approach under PDA); Reiter, supra note 45, at 8-11 (critiquing the disability
model as applied to breastfeeding).
54. 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994). The district court decision is found at Troupe v. May
Dep't Stores Co., No. 92-C2605, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7751 (N.D. III. June 4, 1993).
55. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736.
56. Id. at 735. To the extent that Troupe's termination was based on her work absences
caused by the morning sickness, the discharge today would violate the Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA). See Miller v. AT&T Corp., 250 F.3d 820, 834 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that
severe morning sickness qualifies as a serious health condition under the FMLA); Pendarvis
v. Xerox Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55-56 (D.D.C. 1998) (denying summary judgment to em-
ployer in an FMLA case on the ground that any pregnancy-related period of incapacity,
including morning sickness, constitutes a serious health condition). Troupe was dismissed in
1991, well before the FMLA was enacted. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735.
57. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735-36.
58. Id. at 739.
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employees., 5' As the court saw it, in order for Ms. Troupe to prevail
on her gender discrimination claim she had to establish that May
would not have dismissed a non-pregnant employee under similar
circumstances. Thus, within the confines of a formal equality
concept, Ms. Troupe, and other pregnant workers, could "require
employers to offer maternity leave or take other steps to make it
easier for [them] to work, 61 only if the employer is taking
comparable steps to aid similarly situated non-pregnant workers.
This requirement, of course, ignores the fact that pregnancy
imposes on certain women specific burdens not experienced by
workers who are not pregnant.
Collectively, Bass, iMartinez, and Troupe indicate that treating em-
ployment inequities caused by work-parenting conflicts as a
problem of formal inequality between men and women is a limited
strategy to assist working parents. Within the constraints of formal
equality, women can sustain a claim for equal treatment only if they
can establish their similarity to men.62 A key problem with this ap-
proach is that it takes for granted the male status quo63 and fails to
recognize how the experiences of men and women differ, both so-
cially and biologically. In light of gender-based differences, formal
equality's adoption of a male norm will inevitably disadvantage
mothers as well as other women who have primary child care re-
sponsibilities.
59. Id. at 738.
60. Id. at 738; see also Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 35, at 373 (observing that the Troupe
court "read 'pregnancy' out of the PDA and interpreted it to mean that discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy is on the basis of sex only if there is a nonpregnant person in the
employer's workplace with similar needs receiving better treatment").
61. Troupe, 20 E3d at 738 (citations omitted).
62. See MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 15, at 220-21 (observing that under
the formalism of the sameness/difference doctrine "women are measured according to
correspondence with man").
63. See CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, Difference And Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAw 32, 34 (1987) [hereinafter
MACKINNON, Difference And Dominance] (observing that "[g]ender neutrality is... simply the
male standard, and the special protection rule is simply the female standard, but do not be
deceived: masculinity, or maleness, is the referent for both"); MACKINNON, FEMINIST THE-
ORY, supra note 15, at 220 (maintaining that concealed within the law of gender equality is
the "substantive way in which man has become the measure of all things"); see also Abrams,
Gender Discrimination, supra note 12, at 1190 (observing that "women have come to see that
the norms of the 'workplace' might be nothing more than the norms of the dominant
group within it [and] the wisdom of conformity has been called into question").
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B. Disparate Impact
In theory, because it does not require a showing of intent, dispa-
rate impact analysis offers a better route than disparate treatment
to contest discrimination based on parenthood. As stated earlier,
6 4
to succeed on a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff must demon-
strate that a neutral practice or policy caused a disproportionate
impact on the employment opportunities of the protected group
of which the plaintiff is a member.5 In the context of parenting,
gender-based disparate impact analysis can help challenge facially-
neutral practices that disadvantage women. 66 To illustrate, consider
the decisions in EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co. 67 and Roberts v. United
States Postmaster General.
68
At issue in Warshawsky was an employer's policy that precluded
employees from taking any paid sick leave during the first year of
employment. 9 The plaintiff alleged that the policy disparately im-
pacted women. In support of that claim, the plaintiff introduced
statistics showing that the employer had terminated fifty-three first-
70year employees pursuant to the policy, fifty of whom were women.
In denying the employer's motion to dismiss, the court observed
that women were discharged at substantially higher rates than men
because women required more time off from work due to preg-
7'nancy. Indeed, of the fifty women discharged, twenty were
pregnant.
72
Roberts also entailed a challenge to an employer's sick leave pol-
icy. The plaintiff wanted to use her sick leave benefits to attend to
64. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (distinguishing between disparate
treatment and disparate impact discrimination).
65. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609-11 (1993); Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 432-34 (1971).
66. See HEYMANN, THE WIDENING GAP, supra note 1, at 149-51; ARLIE HOCHSCHILD,
THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 6-10 (1989).
67. 768 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. II1. 1991).
68. 947 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Tex. 1996); see also Abraham v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 660
F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that a ten-day disability leave policy raised a disparate
impact claim because it was inadequate for pregnancy purposes); Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm'r
of Labor & Indus., 692 P.2d 1243, 1255 (Mont. 1984) (holding that a neutral policy prohibit-
ing leaves to new employees was discriminatory because of disparate impact on women),
vacated by 479 U.S. 1050 (1986), aff'd on reh'g, 744 P.2d 871 (Mont. 1987).
69. Warshawsky, 768 F. Supp. at 650.
70. Id. at 651-52.
71. Id. at 654.
72. Id. at 651-52.
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the medical needs of her premature child. 3 The employer's policy,
however, restricted the availability of sick leave to a worker's own
illness.4 In her Title VII action, the plaintiff claimed that the sick
leave policy had an adverse impact upon women because it forced
them to resign more often than men due to their childrearing
role.7' Concluding that the plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to
support the claim, the court denied the employer's motion to dis-
miss.
76
A disparate impact analysis could eliminate a variety of gender-
neutral workplace policies that conflict with parenting and thereby
disadvantage women. For example, in addition to the sick leave
policies in Warshawsky and Roberts, a disparate impact case might
challenge employer policies that require frequent travel, excessive
time commitments, and unpredictable work hours. Despite the po-
tential to use disparate impact analysis to contest neutral
employment practices that adversely affect working mothers, how-
ever, and notwithstanding Warshawsky and Roberts, litigants have177
achieved few victories proving such claims.
The obstacles to sustaining a gender-based disparate impact
claim in the context of parenting are numerous. For one, disparate
impact analysis, no less than disparate treatment, hinges on a for-
malistic comparative notion of equality. As part of a disparate
impact prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that a challenged
practice produced unfavorable consequences for the class of
women relative to men.7s This showing requires that the employer's
workplace contain a statistically significant number of men simi-
larly situated to plaintiff, for comparison purposes.7 9 This
73. Roberts, 947 F. Supp. at 284.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 287.
76. Id. at 288.
77. See Dowd, Gender Paradox, supra note 12, at 137 (describing the many difficulties
with trying "to fit particular sex/gender aspects of work-family conflict within the disparate
impact framework"); Eichner, supra note 12, at 139 n.18 (commenting on the theoretical
potential and practical limitations of invoking disparate impact doctrine to challenge job
requirements, and collecting cases).
78. See, e.g., Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1126 (7th Cir. 1987) ("All the
plaintiff need show to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact is that the ostensibly
neutral criterion (like height or weight or baldness) excludes a disproportionate fraction of
a favored group, such as blacks or women."); EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 969 E Supp.
727, 735 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ("To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact sex discrimi-
nation, the plaintiff must show that a facially neutral practice of the employer has a
disproportionate impact on one sex.").
79. See, e.g., Morgan v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 867 E2d 1023, 1027 (7th Cir. 1989)
(holding that a "prima facie case of disparate impact is established by showing through sig-
nificant statistical disparity that a facially neutral employment practice has a discriminatory
impact on a protected class"); Wilma Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 107 E Supp. 2d 744,
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requirement can be extremely burdensome given the pervasiveness
of gender-based occupational segregation in United States labor
markets.80 Although women currently account for almost half of all
workers,"' women and men work in different occupations, different
812industries, and different firms. In short, women tend to work with
other women, concentrated in jobs that pay markedly less than
those held by men.83
This reality presents a practical hurdle for disparate impact liti-
gants because courts examine only the composition of a particular
work setting and do not adopt a broader societal perspective.
4
Consider, for example, a hypothetical mechanical engineering firm
747 (N.D. Miss. 2000) (" [S] tatistical disparities supporting a claim of imbalance must be
'sufficiently substantial' before they raise an inference of discrimination"); Payseur v. W.W.
Grainger, Inc., 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 789, 791 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (observing in the
context of a gender disparate impact case that evidence of a gender-based statistical disparity
"must be sufficiently substantial to raise an inference of discriminatory impact"); see also
Tranquilli v. Irshad, 454 N.E.2d 377, 378 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (observing that the "most fun-
damental requirement for a showing of sex discrimination is a demonstration that men and
women were treated in a dissimilar manner because of their sex. If the applicant pool for a
position is comprised entirely of one sex, there can be no dissimilar treatment of the sexes
in the hiring process. And without dissimilar treatment of the sexes, there can be no sex
discrimination.").
80. See Amy S. Wharton, Feminism at Work, 571 ANNALS 167, 172 (2000) (observing that
"[g]ender segregation is an entrenched and pervasive feature of the industrial workplace");
Committee on Women's Employment and Related Social Issues, National Research Council,
in WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK: SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB 5-9 (Barbara F. Reskin &
Heidi I. Hartmann eds., 1986) (noting that the "segregation of the sexes is a basic feature of
the [U.S.] world of work").
81. See WOMEN'S BUREAU, DEP'T OF LABOR, 20 FACTS ON WORKING WOMEN (2000),
available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/wb/public/wbpubs/2OfactOO.htm (last visited Mar. 17,
2002) [hereinafter DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU] (on file with the University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform) (reporting that "[w]omen's share of the labor force reached 46
percent in 1994 and has remained at this level" and by "2008, women are projected to com-
prise 48 percent of the labor force").
82. See Wharton, supra note 80, at 172 (commenting that "[w]omen make up almost
half of the paid labor force, but women and men are employed in different occupations,
firms, and jobs"); see also DONALD TOMASKOVIc-DEVEY, GENDER & RACIAL INEQUALITY AT
WORK: THE SOURCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF JOB SEGREGATION 111-27 (1993); Randy P.
Albelda, Occupational Segregation by Race and Gender 1958-1981, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
404 (1986); Mary C. King, Occupational Segregation by Race and Sex, 1940-88, 115 MONTHLY
LAB. REV. 30 (1992). See generally Jerry A.Jacobs, The Sex Segregation of Occupations: Prospects for
the 21st Century, in HANDBOOK OF GENDER AND WORK (Gary N. Powell ed., 1999);Jerry A.
Jacobs, Long-Term Trends in Occupational Segregation by Sex, 95 AM.J. Soc. 160 (1989).
83. See, e.g., William Bielby & James Baron, A Woman's Place Is with Other Women: Sex Seg-
regation Within Organizations, in WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK: SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB
(Barbara Reskin & Heidi Hartmann eds., 1986); William Bielby &James Baron, Sex Segrega-
tion Within Occupations, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 43 (May 1986).
84. See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1034 (1986) [hereinafter Colker, Anti-Subordination] (criticizing dispa-
rate impact theory for only challenging policies "within an employer's workforce over a
limited time period" and for lacking a "societal perspective").
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that provides its technicians with a month of paid sick leave each
year, exclusive of leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA).85 Support staff are allowed ten days of paid sick leave an-
nually, exclusive of FMLA leave. The leave can be used for an
employee's own illness or the illness of a family member. The em-
ployer terminates any employee who misses more than the allotted
sick leave. The support staff, comprised largely of secretaries, office
clerks, and accounting clerks, is ninety percent female,8 6 while
women account for only ten percent of the technicians. 87 During
the past five years, only female support staff violated the policy, and
all of the violators were terminated. A former support staff em-
ployee challenges the policy, arguing that it has a disparate impact
because women require leave to care for children more frequently
than do men.
At first glance, it may appear that the plaintiff stands an excel-
lent chance of establishing a prima facie case. After all, the policy
has had no adverse effect on the technicians, a group that consists
largely of men. The disparate impact analysis, however, will con-
centrate on the male support staff-the group that is similarly
situated to plaintiff.8 But because this group of male support staff
represents a relatively small comparison sample, a plaintiff may
85. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994). See infra Part V.A. (discussing the FMLA).
86. According to the Department of Labor, the largest share of employed women work
in technical, sales, and administrative support occupations. See DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S
BUREAU, supra note 81. More specifically, women account for 98.9% of all "secretaries,"
92.1% of all "bookkeepers, accounting, & auditing clerks," and 83.6% of all "general office
clerks." See DEP'T OF LABOR, 20 LEADING OCCUPATIONS OF EMPLOYED WOMEN 2000 ANNUAL
AVERAGES available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/wb/public/wbpubs/20lead2OOO.htm (last
visited Mar. 17, 2002) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
87. According to the Department of Labor, women actually account for 5.3% of all
mechanical engineering technicians. See DEP'T OF LABOR, NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS
FOR WOMEN IN 2001, available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/wb/public/wb_pubs/
nontrad2001_txLhtm (last visited Mar. 17, 2002) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
88. See, e.g., Molloy v. Blanchard, 115 F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 1997) ("For the prima facie
case, a disparate impact plaintiff must 'identify and relate specific instances where persons
situated similarly 'in all relevant aspects' were treated differently.' ") (emphasis added) (quot-
ing Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth Coll., 889 E2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1989)); Wislocki-Goin v.
Mears, 831 E2d 1374, 1379-80 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 936 (1988) (finding that
plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of either disparate treatment or disparate im-
pact under Title VII because she did not demonstrate that similarly-situated male employees
were treated differently); Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 94 Civ.8494 (HB), 1999
WL 944505, 85 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 156 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 1999) (dismissing plain-
tiff's disparate impact claim because of failure to establish that the comparison group of
employees was similarly situated in all material respects); Donnelly v. R.I. Bd. of Governors
for Higher Educ., 929 F. Supp. 583, 590 (D.R.I. 1996) (noting that "[iun order to establish
that the adverse impact is disparate, the employee must show that the unfavorable conse-
quences are borne disproportionately by the members of the class in comparison to non-
members who are similarly situated").
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find it difficult to satisfy her prima facie case. s9 This hypothetical
illustrates that formal notions of gender equality can leave undis-
turbed the discriminatory processes that segregate women into
jobs that offer fewer benefits than jobs held predominantly .by
men. By focusing solely on the composition of the employer's
workforce, a gender-based disparate impact analysis may not ad-
dress the inequality associated with occupational segregation and
the ensuing impact on employees with child care responsibilities. 90
II. PARENTHOOD AS A PROTECTED CLASS
In view of the inadequacies of a gender-oriented approach to
redress occurrences of parental-status-based discrimination,
perhaps it is not surprising that commentators have suggested that
for society to seriously value parenting, parents should be treated
as a protected class under employment anti-discrimination law.91
Presently, a handful of state and local jurisdictions provide
employees and prospective employees more direct protection from
discrimination based on parental status than that afforded by a
prohibition against gender discrimination. In Alaska, for example,
the state's Human Rights Act bans employment discrimination
predicated on "parenthood" when the "reasonable demands of the
position" do not warrant such a distinction. 9 In the District of
89. See Dowd, Maternity Leave, supra note 16, at 765 (noting that it may be difficult to
sustain a disparate impact analysis in the context of female-segregated workplaces); see also
MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 15, at 223-24 (noting the inability of gender
equality law to address the fact that women are concentrated into low-paying jobs); Chamal-
las, supra note 24 (examining Title VII efforts to challenge employer rules in predominantly
female jobs).
90. Much of the gender wage gap is attributable to occupational segregation by gen-
der. See, e.g., Andrea S. Christensen, Women in the United States Labor Force, 5 COMP. LAB. L.J.
437, 452 (1982) (observing that job segregation is a major cause of women's low pay, ac-
counting for up to thirty percent of the male-female wage gap); Elaine Sorenson, The Wage
Effects of Occupational Sex Composition: A Review and New Findings, in COMPARABLE WORTH:
ANALYSES AND EVIDENCE 57, 78-79 (M. Anne Hill & Mark R. Killingsworth eds., 1989);
WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FORJOBS OF EQUAL VALUE 33-38 (DonaldJ. Treiman
& Heidi I. Hartmann eds., 1981).
91. See supra note 17 (collecting references supportive of measures to prohibit em-
ployment discrimination based on parental status).
92. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a) (1) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
race, religion, color, national origin, age, physical or mental disability, sex, parenthood,
marital status, changes in marital status, and pregnancy); see also Lisa Demer, Mom Puts Up
Fight; Accounting Firm Denies Firing Woman Over Kids, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEwS,July 11, 1999,
at IB (reporting on parenting discrimination case filed under the Alaska Human Rights
Act).
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Columbia, employees are protected from employment
discrimination on the basis of "familial status"9 3 and "family
responsibilities."94 The D.C. statute defines these terms in relation
to minor children.95 Connecticut also offers some protection to
employees from discrimination based on parenting responsibilities
in the employment context. 9 Local governments that expressly
prohibit parental-status-based employment discrimination include97 9 0 0
Atlanta, Aspen," Chicago, 99 Dade County,00 Harrisburg, PA,'0 ' and
93. District of Columbia Human Rights Act, D.C. CODEANN. § 2-1400 (2001).
94. Id. § 2-1411.02.
95. Id. § 2-1402 (A) (1A) (defining "familial status" to mean "one or more individuals
under 18 years of age being domiciled with: (1) a parent or other person having legal custody
of the individual; or (2) the designee, with written authorization of the parent, or other per-
sons having legal custody of individuals under 18 years of age. The protection afforded against
discrimination on the basis of familial status shall apply to any person who is pregnant or in the
process of securing legal custody of any individual under 18 years of age"); Id. § 1-2502(12)
(defining "family responsibilities" to mean "the state of being, or the potential to become, a
contributor to the support of a person or persons in a dependent relationship, irrespective of
their number, including the state of being the subject of an order of withholding or similar
proceedings for the purpose of paying child support or a debt related to child support").
96. Connecticut prohibits employers from asking employees or prospective employees
questions concerning their familial responsibilities. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60 (a) (9)
(2001) (prohibiting "an employer ... [from] request[ing] or require[ing] information from
an employee [or] person seeking employment ... relating to ... the individual's familial re-
sponsibilities").
97. ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES, No. 2000-79, § 1 (2000) (prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination based on race, color, creed, religion, sex, domestic relationship status,
parental status, familial status, sexual orientation, national origin, gender identity, age, or dis-
ability). The ordinance defines "familial status" as "the state of being a person who is domiciled
with one or more minor children, with the permission of the parent or person with legal cus-
tody of such minor child or children." Id. The ordinance defines "parental status" as "a parent,
step-parent, adoptive parent, guardian, foster parent or custodian of a minor child or chil-
dren." Id.; see also City of Atlanta Enacts Ordinance Prohibiting Discrimination in Private Employment,
at http://www.kilstock.com/site/print/detailArticleId=855 (last visited Mar. 18, 2002).
98. ASPEN, COLO., MUN. CODE § 13-98 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in employ-
ment because of race, creed, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, sex, age, marital or
familial status, physical handicap, sexual orientation, or political affiliation).
99. Chicago Human Rights Ordinance, CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 2-160-020 (1990) (pro-
hibiting discrimination in employment because of race, color, sex, age, religion, disability,
national orign, ancestry, sexual orientation, marital status, parental status, military discharge
status or source of income).
100. DADE CouNTv, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11A-26 (1997) (prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination "on account of the race, color, religion, ancestry, sex, pregnancy, national
origin, age, disability, marital status, familial status or sexual orientation of any individual or
any person associated with such individual"); see also id. § 1 1A-2 (9) (defining "familial status" as
"(a) An individual who has not attained the age of eighteen (18) years is domiciled with a par-
ent or other person having legal custody of such individual; or (b) An individual who has not
attained the age of eighteen (18) years is domiciled with a designee of a parent or other person
having legal custody of such individual with the written permission of such parent or other
person; or (c) An individual becomes pregnant or is in the process of securing legal custody of
any individual who has not attained the age of eighteen (18) years").
101. Harrisburg Human Relations Ordinance, HARRISBURG, PA., CODE § 114-1 (prohibit-
ing discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, place of birth,
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Tacoma, WA."2 The enactment of legislation to prohibit workplace.
discrimination based on parental-status reflects a growing concern
that working parents are at a disadvantage relative to workers who
do not have child care responsibilities.
A. The Proposed Ending Discrimination Against Parents Act
In 1999, the idea of extending fair employment laws to include
workers with parental responsibilities gained national attention. Dur-
ing his State of the Union Address that year, President Clinton called
upon Congress to pass legislation banning employment discrimina-
tion against workers because of their status as parents.0' Shortly
thereafter, Senators Christopher Dodd and Edward Kennedy intro-
duced the Ending Discrimination Against Parents Act (EDPA) . The
proposed act is the private-sector parallel to Executive Order
13,152. °10 Signed by President Clinton in May, 2000, Executive Order
13,152 amends Executive Order 11,478 to add "parental status" to
the characteristics covered by the federal government's equal em-
ployment opportunity policy.0 6 The proposed EDPA prohibits
employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations from "dis-
criminating against parents and persons with parental responsibilities
based on the assumption that they cannot satisfy the requirements of
a particular position."0 7 The bill broadly defines "parent" as a person
who has a relationship to someone under the age of eighteen or to
someone who is eighteen or older but unable to care for himself
sex, age, handicap or disability, familial status, GED, sexual orientation/preference or asso-
ciation with or advocacy on behalf of persons in these categories).
102. TACOMA, WASH., MUN. CODE, Ch.1.29.050(A) (1993) (prohibiting employment
discrimination based on "race, religion, color, national origin or ancestry, sex, age, marital
status, familial status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, unless
based upon a bona fide occupational qualification").
103. See Christopher Caldwell, Rights For The Rents, WEEKLY STANDARD, May 3, 1999, at
19; Clinton Outlines His Vision for Nation's Transition to the 21st Century, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
1999, at A22; President William Jefferson Clinton State of the Union Address, FED. DEP'T AND
AGENCY DOCUMENTS, Jan. 19, 1999 ("I want to ask Congress to prohibit companies from
refusing to hire or promote workers simply because they have children.").
104. S. 1907, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999). For accounts of the bill, see David E.
Rosenbaum, Going Easy on Parents Isn't So Easy, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2000, § 4 at 6; Bill Would
Prevent Employers From Discriminating Against Parents, FED. EEO ADVISOR, Dec. 16, 1999, Vol. 2,
No. 11.
105. Exec. Order No. 13,152, 3 C.F.R. 264 (2000).
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), (e) (1994); see alsoAndrew Mollison, Clinton Issues Ban on
Bias for Parents with FederalJobs, SEATrrL POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 3,2000, at A5.
107. S. 1907, 106th Cong., at § 3(a).
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where the relationship is based on the person's status as (i) a biologi-
cal parent, (ii) an adoptive parent, (iii) a foster parent, (iv) a
stepparent, (v) a custodian of a legal ward, (vi) an individual actively
seeking legal custody or adoption, or (vii) an individual who stands
in loco parentis.
EDPA's basic framework parallels Title VII,'0 ' and its central fea-
ture is a disparate treatment provision that is virtually identical to
one of the main prohibitory sections of Title VIL." 0 The proposed
provision makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to
hire, or to discharge, any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with regard to the compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment of the individual, because
such individual is a parent."' As variously characterized, the provi-
sion bars employers from "hiring applicants without children over
equally qualified parents and from refusing to hire single par-
ents;"'l 2 from "taking workers with parental responsibilities off the
fast track because of assumptions that they would not be able to
perform in demanding jobs;"' 3 and from refusing to hire or pro-
mote both men and women who are parents based on
unwarranted stereotypes or overbroad assumptions about their
level of commitment to the workforce.'
4
B. The Potential Value of Treating Parents as a Protected Class
Although EDPA languished in congressional committees,' the
question remains: Can a prohibition against parental-status-based
discrimination in employment overcome the weaknesses of formal
equality's approach to gender discrimination? This section investi-
gates that question by evaluating three scenarios in which plaintiffs
108. Id. § 4(k).
109. A key difference between the EDPA and Tide VII is that the former explicidy disal-
lows recovery for disparate impact claims. Id. § 9. Part III of this Article considers the
possible benefits of treating parents as a protected class from both a disparate treatment and
a disparate impact perspective.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2) (1994).
111. S. 1907, 106th Cong., at§ 5(a)(1).
112. Clinton Supports Bill to End Workplace Discrimination Against Parents, 15 COMMUNITY
ACTION 5 (1999).
113. Id.
114. Charles Babington, Clinton to Seek Ban on Job Bias Against Parents, WASH. POST, April
17, 1999, at Al.
115. On November 10, 1999, the bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions, where it remained until Congress adjourned. S. 1907,
106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999).
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may benefit by pursuing a claim of parental status discrimination.
The first two scenarios involve intentional discrimination while the
third scenario concerns indirect discrimination.
1. Scenario One: The Absence of Similarly Situated Men-At issue in
the first hypothetical scenario are allegations of intentional dis-
crimination, based on stereotypes or assumptions about employees
with parental obligations, that do not fit within a gender discrimi-
nation framework because the plaintiff cannot prove that the
employer has treated members of the opposite sex differently. One
can gauge the potential benefits of classifying parenthood as a pro-
tected category in this scenario by revisiting Bass v. Chemical
Banking Corp.' 16 Recall that in Bass, the plaintiff filed suit for gender
discrimination when the employer failed to promote her based on
her gender plus either her marital or parental status. The court
dismissed the claim, holding that the plaintiff had not established a
prima facie case of discrimination; specifically, Ms. Bass did not satisfy
the fourth element of her prima facie case," 7 which required that she
demonstrate that the employer's failure to promote her occurred
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimi-
nation based on membership in the protected class."" The court
found that Ms. Bass had failed to prove this element because (1) the
promotion at issue ultimately went to a woman-a member of her
own protected class-and (2) she was unable to offer evidence show-
ing that the employer had treated women with children differently
than men with children." 9 Had Ms. Bass been able to claim discrimi-
nation based on her status as a parent, however, she most likely could
have established a prima facie case with ease, given that the employer
promoted someone outside the protected class of parents, namely, an
individual without children. 2° Because this approach does not center
116. No. 94 Civ. 8833, 1996 WL 374151 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1996). See supra notes 36-40
and accompanying text (discussing Bass).
117. A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1)
she was a member of a protected class; (2) she applied for the position and was qualified for
it; (3) she was rejected for the position; and (4) she was replaced by a person outside the
protected group. See, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972); Stockett v. Muncie Ind. Tran-
sit Sys., 221 E3d 997, 1001 (7th Cir. 2000).
118. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; see also Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th
Cir. 1992) (indicating that the fourth element of the prima facie disparate treatment case is
satisfied by showing that a similarly situated employee, outside of plaintiffs protected class,
received better treatment for the same or similar conduct).
119. Bass, 1996 WL 374151, at *5.
120. See Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 582-83 (indicating that the prima facie disparate treatment
case can be satisfied by showing that a similarly situated employee, outside of plaintiffs pro-
tected class, received better treatment for the same or similar conduct).
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on gender, the fact that the person promoted was also a woman be-
comes irrelevant.
In addition, whereas Ms. Bass' failure to show that the employer
had favored men with children undermined her gender discrimi-
nation claim, the same fact supports a claim of parental
discrimination. Indeed, part of the appeal of a parental-status ap-
proach to discrimination stems from its comprehension of mutual
disadvantage. Even when courts recognize the gender neutrality of
parenting, and acknowledge that work-parenting discord can harm
both men and women,"' this awareness does not translate into re-
lief for plaintiffs unless parenting disadvantages can be reduced to
issues of sex discrimination. In contrast to gender anti-
discrimination doctrine, which targets comparative disadvantages
between the sexes, a discrimination model premised on parental
status focuses on inequities between parents and non-parents. By
shifting the lens from men and women to parents and non-parents,
a parenting model of discrimination can potentially challenge
conduct that discriminates against both men and women with pa-
rental obligations.1
2
2. Scenario Two: Intersectional Claims-Treating parenthood as a
protected class may also prove useful in scenarios involving low-
income single mothers of color, many of whom are former welfare
recipients who face substantial obstacles to permanent employ-
ment.13 In addition to the problems of inadequate child care,
limited job training, and a lack of transportation, women of color
struggling to transition from welfare to work must contend withd .. . . 124
discrimination. Public perceptions of welfare dependency are
121. See Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 E2d 340, 342 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining
that "[wihile the class of new parents... includes women who give birth to children, it also
includes women who become mothers through adoption rather than childbirth and men
who become fathers through either adoption or biology").
122. Others have proposed different approaches to prohibit employment discrimina-
tion against parents. See Catherine G. Meier, Protecting Parental Leave: A Fundamental Rights
Model, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 177, 208 (1997) (putting forth a fundamental rights model of
parenthood that "recognizes that employment discrimination on the basis of child-rearing
and childbearing decisions interferes with the fundamental right to privacy").
123. See, e.g., Lucie E. White, Facing South: Lauyering For Poor Communities in The Twenty-
first Century, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 813 (1998) (discussing the impact of welfare reform on
low-income women with children); Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency"
from a Different Ground, 81 CEO. L.J. 1961 (1993); see generally KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN,
MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND Low-WAGE WORK
(1997).
124. See SUSAN. T. GOODEN, RACE AND WELFARE REPORT: EXAMINING RACIAL DIFFERENCES
IN EMPLOYMENT STATUS AMONG WELFARE RECIPIENTS (1997) at http://www.arc.org/
gripp/researchPublications/reports/gooden Report/reportTilePg.h tml (documenting various
reasons, including discrimination, to explain racial disparities in employment outcomes be-
tween black and white welfare recipients); see also WELFARE LAW CENTER, STRATEGIES TO
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highly racialized and gendered; the general public associates wel-
fare almost exclusively with women of color, especially African-
American women. 25 Stereotypes cast welfare recipients as lazy,
slothful, morally bankrupt, and irresponsible women who bear il-
legitimate children on the taxpayer's dime.126 Despite the fact that
the majority of welfare recipients are white, 27 the race-typing of
welfare as a problem unique to poor single black mothers persists
in the public mind and hinders their ability to attain economic self-
sufficiency.
28
IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS DISCRIMINATION IN WELFARE PROGRAMS 2 (2000) (discussing impact
of discrimination in job search experiences of former welfare recipients).
125. See, e.g., Wahneema Lubiano, Black Ladies, Welfare Queens, and State Minstrels: Ideo-
logical Warfare by Narrative Means, in RACING JUSTICE, ENGENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON
ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 320, 330-33
(Toni Morrison ed., 1992); Sylvia A. Law, Ending Wefare as We Know It, 49 STAN. L. REV. 471,
493 (1997) (observing that "[t]he popular perception is that welfare mothers are black, and
while racism has become socially and legally unacceptable, condemning welfare mothers
remains as American as apple pie"). For accounts of the historical link between welfare and
race, see generally, LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE
HISTORY OF WELFARE (1994); GWENDOLYN MINK, THE WAGES OF MOTHERHOOD: INEQUALITY
IN THE WELFARE STATE, 1917-1942 (1995);JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: How
RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994) (exploring the connection between the
lack of success of American public policy programs and American perceptions of race).
126. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT 71-78 (1990) (concluding
that the stereotype of lazy, irresponsible welfare mothers is one of the most harmful images
of black women); Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, Welfare Queens and Other Fairy
Tales: Welfare Reforms and Unconstitutional Reproductive Controls, 38 How. L.J. 473, 482-85
(1995) (citing the historically pervasive images of black women as sexually promiscuous and
lazy, views that enable policymakers to shift the blame for the women's problems away from
systemic social factors to the women themselves); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts
Who Have Babies: Women of Color Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419,
1444 (1991) (describing "the contemporary image of the lazy welfare mother who breeds
children at the expense of taxpayers in order to increase the amount of her welfare check");
Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs Welfare Legisla-
tion Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159, 1178 (1995) (examining how media portrayals of
welfare recipients have shifted over time from that of "worthy white widow to lazy African-
American breeder" and how the latter image has served to argue in favor of welfare reform
measures).
127. See, e.g., Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 126, at 486-87 (observing that the typical
welfare recipient is portrayed as African-American even though African-American families
comprised only 36.6% of AFDC families in 1993, whereas white families comprised 38.3% of
AFDC recipients); Hope Lewis, Lionheart Gals Facing the Dragon: The Human Rights of In-
ter/national Black Women in the United States, 76 OR. L. REv. 567, 624 (1997) (noting that the
images of black women "adorn the covers of magazines discussing welfare reform, even
though the majority of recipients of welfare are White"). See generally MARTIN GILENS, WHY
AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY
(1999).
128. Martin Gilens, "Race Coding" and White Opposition to Welfare, 90 Am. POL. SCI. REv.
593, 602 (1996) (observing that even as whites represent the majority of welfare recipients,
white America associates welfare with "black welfare mothers"); Martin Gilens, Race and
Poverty in America: Public Misperceptions and the American News Media, 60 PUB. OPINION Q. 515,
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Ideally, Title VII should provide a remedy when such stereotypes
operate to the disadvantage of women of color. Within the sex-plus
paradigm, 29 plaintiffs should be able to pursue a discrimination
claim predicated on their status as women of color with children
who have been treated differently on account of their race, sex,
and parental status. It is doubtful, however, that the sex-plus
framework can sustain this charge in light of judicial reluctance to
apply the framework to discrimination claims that involve multiple
factors. In Judge v. Marsh,13 0 a case with a black female plaintiff, the
court limited the sex-plus doctrine "to employment decisions based
on one protected, immutable trait or fundamental right, which are
directed against individuals sharing a second protected, immutable
characteristic.'.' i The court argued that capping the number of
characteristics at two was necessary to avoid turning employment
discrimination into "a many-headed Hydra." 13 2 Applying the Judge
logic, a woman of color would be unable to maintain a discrimina-
tion claim on the base of her race and sex, plus a third factor such
as parental status.1
3
The Judge holding fails to recognize the complexity of individual
' 34
experiences and capitulates to essentialism. It effectively con-
516 (1996) ("Americans substantially exaggerate the degree to which blacks compose the
poor ... [and] white Americans with the most exaggerated misunderstandings of the racial
composition of the poor are the most likely to oppose welfare.").
129. See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text (discussing use of the sex-plus doc-
trine to challenge employment discrimination based on parental status).
130. 649 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1986).
131. Id. at 780.
132. Id.
133. See Peggie R. Smith, Separate Identities: Black Women, Work, and Title VII, 14 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 21 (1991) (illustrating how the Judge holding disadvantages litigants who en-
counter discrimination on the basis of more than two factors, i.e., sex plus race plus parental
status).
134. In the context of gender, essentialism refers to the notion that there exists a mono-
lithic, universal, "essential" women's experience that can adequately capture the experiences
of all women, irrespective of differences such as race, class, or sexual orientation. See generally
ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT (1988) (exploring problems of essentialism in feminism). For discussions of es-
sentialism in the law, particularly with respect to race and gender, and the duplication of
essentialist tendencies in feminist legal theory, see Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis.
L. REv. 539 (criticizing anti-discrimination law for failing to account for the experiences of
black women); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (examining how anti-discrimination doctrine marginalizes the multidi-
mensional experiences of black women); Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 610 (1990) (discussing the ways in which much of femi-
nist legal theory excludes the experiences of women of color); Elizabeth M. Iglesias,
Structures of Subordination: Women of Color at the Intersection of Title VII and NLRA. Not!, 28
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 395 (1993) (examining the effects of essentialist tendencies in labor
laws and employment discrimination laws on women of color in the workplace); Smith,
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strains the ability of women of color with children to confront
negative and harmful stereotypes that portray them as undeserv-
ing.13 5 Extending the scope of fair employment laws to include
parental status can help overcome this limitation by allowing plain-
tiffs to directly contest such discrimination based on their parental
status.
3. Scenario Three: Too Few Men-The third scenario in which a
parental-status-based discrimination claim may prove more viable
than a claim of gender discrimination involves employer reliance
on neutral practices that disadvantage workers with parental re-
sponsibilities, particularly in female-intensive workplaces. 3 6 Even if
the disadvantaged workers are primarily women, it will be difficult
to sustain a disparate impact challenge to the employment prac-
tice. The problem for our hypothetical plaintiffs is that because
they work in a predominantly female setting, there may not exist a
statistically significant group of male employees to establish a
prima facie case of gender discrimination inimical to women. Yet,
supra note 133 (examining how employment anti-discrimination law marginalizes the ex-
periences of black women).
135. For thoughtful discussions critical of Judge and the effects of legal essentialism in
employment discrimination case law, see Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female
Subject, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2479 (1994); April Burey, No Dichotomies: Reflections on Equality for
Afican Canadians in R. v. R.D.S., 21 DALHOUSIE L.J. 199 (1998); PamelaJ. Smith, Part II-
Romantic Paternalism-The Ties That Bind: Hierarchies of Economic Oppression That RevealJudicial
Disaffinity for Black Women and Men, 3J. GENDER RACE &JUST. 181 (1999); Smith, supra note
133; Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Remedying Employment Discrimination Against African-American
Males: Stereotypical Biases Engender a Case of Race Plus Sex Discrimination, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 23
(1996);Jesse B. Semple, Note, Invisible Man: Black and Male Under Title VII, 104 HARV. L. REv.
749 (1991); Rosalio Castro & Lucia Corral, Comment, Women of Color and Employment Dis-
crimination: Race and Gender Combined in Title VII Claims, 6 LA RAZA L.J. 159 (1993); Mary
Elizabeth Powell, Comment, The Claims of Women of Color Under Title VII: The Interaction of
Race and Gender, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 413 (1996); Cathy Scarborough, Note, Concep-
tualizing Black Women's Employment Experiences, 98 YALE L.J. 1457 (1989); Virginia W. Wei,
Note, Asian Women and Employment Discrimination: Using Intersectionality Theory to Address Title
VII Claims Based on Combined Factors of Race, Gender and National Origin, 37 B.C. L. REv. 771
(1996).
136. Scenario three presents an issue similar to that in scenario one; namely the ab-
sence of a male comparison group. The key distinction between the two turns on the fact
that scenario one involves a claim of intentional discrimination while scenario three involves
a claim of indirect discrimination. In cases involving disparate treatment claims, a lack of a
comparison group can present an obstacle for a plaintiff but it need not be fatal as other
evidence can be used to establish intent. See Furukawa v. Honolulu Zoological Soc., 936 P.2d
643, 644 (Haw. 1997) (observing that "[t]o prevail on claim of [disparate treatment] em-
ployment discrimination, plaintiff need not proffer evidence that employees outside of
[plaintiff's] protected class received better treatment"). By contrast, a comparison group
must exist in order for a plaintiff to succeed on a disparate impact claim. More importantly,
the number of individuals in the comparison group must be statistically significantly. See
supra notes 78-90 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of occupational segregation
by gender on plaintiffs' ability to sustain a disparate impact claim).
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while jobs are heavily segregated by gender, 37 the same does not
appear true with respect to parental status. As a result, a shift from
a gender-based comparison to one predicated on parenthood ar-
guably should improve the ability of female plaintiffs to establish a
prima facie case when targeting practices that adversely effect the
class of parents.
Like the gender-based anti-discrimination doctrine, a parental-
status-based approach to discrimination involves a comparative no-
tion of equality that construes the world in terms of sameness and
difference. The critical distinction between the two is that a parent-
ing approach has a greater potential to address gender inequities
predicated on parental status because it does not necessarily de-
pend on a male norm. Consequently, it improves the likelihood of
success for plaintiffs like Ms. Bass and Ms. Piantinada.138 It also may
prove instrumental in combating occurrences of parental status
bias that bear the interlocking marks of racism and sexism. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, using parental status as a discrimi-
nation baseline allows for the possibility of advancing parenting as
a gender-neutral activity. At this stage of the analysis, however, it
remains to be seen if these speculative advantages might actually
yield meaningful results. Thus, this Article shifts focus in the next
two Parts to examine both the shortcomings and drawbacks of ex-
panding the scope of anti-discrimination legislation to protect
employees who claim to be victims of discrimination because of
their actual or perceived parental obligations.
III. STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS
Although treating parenthood as a protected status may reduce
the type of old-fashioned bias at issue in scenarios involving the
lack of similarly situated men or intersectional claims (scenarios
one and two discussed previously), intentional discrimination does
not pose a serious impediment to the employment opportunities of
individuals with parental obligations.1 39 Work-parenting conflicts
that typically confront employees are less a matter of intentional
conduct based on prejudice and stereotypes and more a matter of
137. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
138. See Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 E3d 340 (8th Cir. 1997); Bass v. Chem.
Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8833, 1996 WL 374151 (S.D.N.Y.July 2, 1996).
139. See Dowd, Gender Paradox, supra note 12, at 135-36 (observing that very few work-
parenting conflicts "can be ascribed to conduct which would fall within intentional dis-
crimination analysis").
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structural barriers.1 40 The reality is that many parents, especially
women, face child care issues that often clash with their job re-
sponsibilities. Working parents commonly find themselves in a
bind when they must stay home with a child who has a common
medical ailment, meet with a teacher during the middle of the
work day, pick up a child early from school, or secure alternative
child care arrangements. 1 4 Consequently, while eliminating inten-
tional discrimination based on parental status will assist some
employees, it will do little for the majority of parents struggling to
find an acceptable balance between work and family. To effect
purposeful change on behalf of individuals with parental obliga-
tions, workplace practices must be restructured to value parenting
as a social good that requires affirmative support.
Of course, as indicated earlier, 42 some of these practices are
ideal targets for disparate impact challenges. In addition, as in the
situation involving too few men (scenario three, discussed previ-
ously), a discrimination paradigm based on parenting theoretically
can improve upon the comparative limitations of a gender-based
disparate impact analysis. Yet, from a practical perspective, treating
work/family conflicts as problems of parental discrimination can
achieve little more than can a gender-based anti-discrimination
approach. This Section illustrates the point by discussing Upton v.
JWP Businessland,143 a case that involves problems common to work-
ing parents-long work hours 4  and a lack of adequate child
145
care.
140. Id. at 136 (noting that "[w]ith the exception of certain pregnancy or pregnancy-
related classifications or policies, those aspects of the workplace which cause work-family
conflict are largely structural features that have resulted from the adoption of facially neu-
tral policies, or from the inaction and inadequacies of the structure which generate conflict
between work-family roles").
141. See HEYMANN, THE WIDENING GAP, supra note 1, at 15-31 (describing the many as-
pects of the "predictably unpredictable" nature of caring for children that create constant
work disruptions).
142. See supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text (discussing the potential applicability
of a disparate impact analysis to neutral employment practices that disadvantage women
because of their primary role as caretakers).
143. 682 N.E.2d 1357 (Mass. 1997)
144. See HEWLE-Tr & WEST, supra note 1, at 71-74.
145. See, e.g., Margaret R. Burchinal, The Silent Crisis in the U.S. Child Care: Child Care Ex-
periences and Developmental Outcomes, 563 ANNALS 73 (1999); Peter Cattan, Child-care Problems:
An Obstacle to Work, 114 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3 (1991); William GormleyJr., The Silent Crisis in
U.S. Child Care: Regulating Child Care Quality, 563 ANNALS 116 (1999); Sandra L. Hofferth,
The Silent Crisis in the U.S. Child Care: Child Care, Maternal Employment, and Public Policy, 563
ANNALS 20 (1999).
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Ms. Upton was an at-will employee ofJWP and a single mother. 146
When she was hired, she arranged child care based on JWP's rep-
resentation "that her hours of work would be 8:15 a.m. to 5:30
p.m., with the need to work late on one or two days each month."
47
Once Upton began working, however, herjob necessitated that she
regularly work until 6:30 p.m. or 7:00 p.m. and occasionally as late
as 10:00 p.m., as well as on some weekends. 48JWP discharged Up-
ton after she told the company that she was unable to work such
long hours because of her parental obligations.149 She filed suit
against the company, claiming wrongful discharge in contravention
of public policy.150 Specifically, she alleged that an employer could
not justifiably discharge an employee who refuses to work long
hours in order to fulfill parental responsibilities; to allow her em-
ployer to do so, she contended, would cause her "to neglect her
child in contravention of public policy.", 5' The Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, while "sympathiz[ing] with the difficulties of per-
sons in the position of the plaintiff who face the challenge of
reconciling parental responsibilities with the demands of employ-
ment,", 2 refused to recognize a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will doctrine' 3 and dismissed Upton's claim.5
4
Although the claim in Upton was based on common law, it can be
stylized readily as a disparate impact discrimination claim. As a
matter of gender discrimination, a disparate impact analysis would
probe whether the employer's facially neutral policy of requiring
employees to work evenings and late night hours had a disparate
impact on women relative to men. As a matter of parental status
discrimination, the analysis would be similar except the compari-
son would focus on parents and non-parents. Under both
approaches, the existence of a disparate impact would be likely
given that child care responsibilities are borne disproportionately
146. Upton, 682 N.E.2d at 1358.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1359.
152. Id. at 1360.
153. The employment-at-will doctrine holds that an employment relationship of un-
specified duration is presumptively terminable at the will of either party. SeeJay Feinman,
The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976). Given its
broadest interpretation, the doctrine allows employers to dismiss employees "for any cause,
good or bad, or without cause." Payne v. W. Ad. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 517 (1884). SeeMatthew
W. Finkin, "In Defense of the Contract at Wilt-Some Discussion, Comments, and Questions, 50 J.
AIR I.. & COMMERCE 727, 730-33 (1985) (criticizing Payne).
154. 682 N.E.2d at 1360.
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by women"' and that employees with children typically have less
flexibility than their colleagues without children.'5
Assuming a prima facie case exists, the employer has an oppor-
tunity to justify the impact by showing that the challenged practice
is job-related and necessary to the operation of its business. 57 Be-
cause long hours of work are an acceptable part of most business
practices, an employer could likely satisfy this burden with relative
ease. The plaintiff might still prevail if she could prove that an al-
ternative practice would accomplish the business purpose
advanced by the employer but would have less of a discriminatory
impact on the protected group and that the employer refused to
adopt the alternative.58 Alternatives might include job-sharing, the
creation of part-time positions, and telecommuting options that
would allow some work to be performed at home.1'1
The plaintiff could expect to encounter formidable obstacles,
however, in trying to persuade a court that these alternatives were
viable. In evaluating a proposed alternative, a court examines
whether it is "equally as effective as" the challenged practice in
achieving the employer's legitimate goals.' ° This inquiry presents a
huge ideological hurdle to a plaintiff challenging workplace
practices that collide with family responsibilities. The world of
work is sorely out of step with the realities of a twenty-first century
155. That said, depending on the gender composition of the work force, a plaintiff may
have an easier time establishing a prima facie case of parental status discrimination than of
gender discrimination. See supra notes 78-90 and accompanying text (discussing the effects
of occupational segregation by gender on the ability of plaintiffs to establish a prima facie
case of gender-based discrimination under the disparate impact analysis).
156. See Marybeth Shinn, et al., Promoting the Well-Being of Working Parents: Coping, Social
Support, and flexible Job Schedules, 17 AM. J. OF COMTY. PSYCHOL. 31 (1989); Joan Williams,
Afterword: Exploring the Economic Meanings of Gender, 49 AM. U. L. REv. 987 (2000); Sympo-
sium, Unbending Gender: Panel One: Redesigning Work and the Benefits Related to It, 49 Am. U. L.
REv. 851 (2000).
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i) (1994) (providing that the employer has the
burden of proving "that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question
and consistent with business necessity").
158. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (stating that the plaintiff may prevail if she demon-
strates alternative employment practices and the defendant refuses to adopt the asserted
employment practices).
159. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 1, at 85-88 (referencing various
ways to restructure market work to better accommodate workers-including flexible work
schedules, job-sharing, telecommuting, part-time career tracks, and employer support for
child care and elder care).
160. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 612, 661 (1989) (noting that
"'[f]actors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative selection devices are
relevant in determining whether they would be equally as effective as the challenged prac-
tice in serving the employer's legitimate business goals' ") (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988)).
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workforce. Despite the increasing number of women entering the
paid labor force, the typical work setting remains firmly anchored
to a male-defined image of the ideal worker.'6 ' It is assumed that
the ideal worker takes no time off for childbearing, has no
childrearing responsibilities, and is available to work full-time and
overtime.' 62 Against these views, a disparate impact plaintiff faces
the overwhelming task of convincing courts to seriously entertain
the possibility of "a workplace that departs from the norm of
comprehensive commitment, that accommodates the needs of
working parents, [and] that values the contributions of those
following nontraditional work patterns."
63
Shifting from a gender-based approach to one based on parental
status does not make this task any easier. Even though a model of
parental status discrimination avoids explicit gender-based com-
parisons, the act of parenting is a "a phallocentric," gendered
concept.1' Thus while a parenting approach demands that parents
be treated like non-parents instead of demanding that women be
treated like men, in both cases the standard of equality centers on
a worker who does not have primary responsibility for day-to-day
child care obligations. As long as this standard remains controlling,
few employees-men or women-will be able to use the law to
claim the requisite support to integrate effectively parenting with
work. 15
Ultimately, traditional anti-discrimination law proves too much
in the context of parenting. At its core, the anti-discrimination
principle demands that employers wear blinders when rendering
employment decisions, so as to block out forbidden characteris-
tics. 1 6 While such attribute-masking has proven instrumental indismantling discrimination premised on attributes such as race,
161. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 1, at 2; Abrams, Gender Discrimina-
tion, supra note 12, at 1228 (noting the persistence of workplace practices which assume that
workers are men with wives who take care of child-related concerns); Dowd, Gender Paradox,
supra note 12, at 105 (observing that workplace structure incorporates a patriarchal concep-
tion of family consisting of "a male wage earner in the paid workforce married to a stay-at-
home female spouse who performs the unpaid housework and childcare").
162. Joan C. Williams, Do Wives Own Hal? Winning for Wives After Wendt, 32 CONN. L.
REV. 249, 254 (2000).
163. Abrams, Gender Discrimination, supra note 12, at 1229-30 (adding that unless a
plaintiff can "paint a comprehensive picture of a reconstructed workplace, or ... detail
precisely all the related costs and ripple effects change might create with customers and
clients, the court may be inclined to find her alternative implausible").
164. Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1304
(1987). ,
165. See, Dowd, Gender Paradox, supra note 12, at 115-16 (observing that "[s]imply treat-
ing women 'the same' as men means cutting offany change in the concept of parenting and
accepting the paradigm of non-support or minimal support for that role").
166. Affirmative action is of course a notable exception.
[VOL. 35:3
Parental-Status Employment Discrimination
gender, and age, use of this technique in the context of parenting
would surely prove counterproductive. Employees with child care
obligations are often disadvantaged in the workplace precisely be-
cause employers presently turn a blind eye towards their needs and
assume that they have no parental responsibilities. Instead of
adopting measures to codify employer disinterest in the parental
status of workers, legislatures must do the exact opposite: they
must insist that employers acknowledge the pervasiveness of par-
enting-work conflicts, with an eye towards adopting strategies to
help alleviate those conflicts. Irrespective of whether one ap-
proaches work/parenting conflicts from the perspective of gender
discrimination or parental discrimination, the problem remains
the same: the anti-discrimination model accepts the basic premise
of existing workplace structures and seeks only to eliminate dis-
criminatory defects within those structures.6 7 It does not aim to
create a new structure, one capable of valuing and maintaining a
strong, healthy parent-child bond that will enrich both the family
unit as well as the larger community. Creating such a structure re-
quires a departure from an equal treatment understanding of
equality in favor of a model that respects and accommodates the
familial interests of all workers. Part V offers an initial exploration
of what such a departure might entail. First, however, I argue in
Part IV that treating parents as a protected class not only seems ill-
suited to alleviate work/family conflicts, but also seems ill-advised.
IV. THE MYTH OF PARENTISM
Even as a parental status approach to discrimination is incapable
of substantively altering workplace structures, its proponents insist
that protection nevertheless should be extended to employees with
parenting obligations. While acknowledging the defects of the
approach, they maintain that it is a worthwhile strategy given its
potential to eliminate intentional discrimination against parents of
167. See Colker, Anti-Subordination, supra note 84, at 1034 (observing that because dispa-
rate impact is only available to challenge neutral policies, it cannot be used "to argue for the
possible benefits of race- or sex-specific rules"); Dowd, Gender Paradox, supra note 12, at 139;
Eichner, supra note 12, at 139 (observing that anti-discrimination law is limited by its nature
to protect the broad "spectrum of interests at stake in work-and-parenting conflicts").
168. See Reed, supra note 17, at 14A (observing that the EDPA "in and of itself, will not
solve the entire problem of the time crunch for working families" as "there's far more that
government needs to do, and frankly ... businesses need to do to give parents more
choices").
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the sort outlined earlier in scenarios one and tWo. 169 Advocates ar-
gue that such a strategy, while no panacea, represents an important
piece of the solution to work-parenting conflicts."0
Prohibiting employers from making employment decisions,
based not on individual merit and capacity but on prejudicial be-
liefs about parents and their work commitment, no doubt seems
like a logical extension of meritocratic principles. Certainly, if em-
ployees can meet employer demands for long hours, extensive
travel, and the like, they should not be automatically disqualified
because of their status as parents. To the extent that preconceived
notions about parents are highly gendered and reflect stereotypes
about mothers, rather than parents in general, employees should
have some recourse under gender discrimination prohibitions.
Likewise, if employers rely upon invidious stereotypes about wel-
fare mothers to disadvantage women of color, such discrimination
should be actionable within the sex-plus framework.
However, protecting parents, as parents, from employment dis-
crimination raises troubling concerns about the proper scope of
anti-discrimination doctrine. It is important to remember that fed-
eral law does not prohibit all biased employment decisions. As Lisa
Eichhorn observes,
[i]f one defines prejudice as assumptions based upon stereo-
type, then one may harbor prejudices against an infinite
variety of people. Asians, blonds, athletes, convicted felons,
teenagers, accountants, dog-owners, short people, or any
other identifiable group could, theoretically at least, become
subjects of prejudice and thus targets of discrimination. How-
ever, the law proscribes discrimination only when it is based
upon certain societally sanctioned categories. 7'
Thus the question must be asked: On what basis should society
single out employment prejudice against parents for legal sanc-
169. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 17 (noting comments of Donna Lenhoff, general
counsel of the National Partnership for Women and Families: the EDPA is "getting at old-
fashioned prejudice, and it doesn't matter how much of that there is .... If it is there, it
should be eradicated."); Reed, supra note 17, at 14A (arguing that "outright discrimination
against any parent is wrong and should be stopped, no matter how many cases have been
brought so far").
170. See Special White House Briefing Subject: White House Conference on Teenagers And Presi-
dent's Upcoming School Reform Tour, FED. NEWS SERV., May 2, 2000 (describing the proposed
legislation as "only one piece of a larger strategy to enable parents to have more choices and
choose more time with their children") (comment of Bruce Reed, Director, Domestic Policy
Council).
171. Lisa Eichhorn, Applying the ADA to Mitigating Measures Cases: A Choice of Statutory
Evil, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1071, 1074 (1999).
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tion? This Part investigates that question by comparing parenting
with various protected categories presently precluded under fed-
eral employment discrimination statutes.
Legislative decisions to protect particular groups from employ-
ment discrimination occasionally hinge on a list of factors
comparable to the criteria used by courts to determine which
classifications require heightened judicial scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. 1 These factors include the possession of an im-
mutable characteristic by members of the protected class; the
existence of a history of discrimination against members of the class;
the relevance of the characteristic to legitimate decisionmaking; and
the political power of the class. 73 Of course, the import of these fac-
tors in the legislative process is not the same as in the judicial
process. A given legislative outcome may reflect countless considera-
tions, including the influence of political coalitions and interest
groups as well as the personal prejudices and allegiances of law-
makers. 174 That said, the aforementioned factors do allow for some
comparisons to be made between the justifications for protecting
parents from employment discrimination and the justifications
supporting the protection of other groups that have triggered the
172. See infra Part V.B (discussing the legislative histories of Title VII, the ADA, and the
ADEA).
173. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 16-23 (3d ed. 2000)
(considering such factors as political powerlessness, the history of discrimination, immuta-
ble characteristics, and relevancy between classification and governmental purpose); see also
James W. Ellis, On the "Usefulness" of Suspect Classifications, 3 CONST. COMMENT. 375, 376
(1986);Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: the Case for Applying Em-
ployment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 1049, 1081 (1996) ("The
Supreme Court focuses on immutability, a history of discrimination, lack of political access,
and discrete and insular status as the hallmarks of powerlessness, that trigger heightened
scrutiny."); Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. R v.
107, 123-28 (1990); Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classications: On Discriminating,
Unwittingly or Otherwise, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 937,938-39 (1991).
174. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administra-
tive Law, 64 TEx. L. REv. 469, 497 (1985) (observing that "[n]o extant model is capable of
capturing the interaction of all the subtle and ambiguous forces that determine the out-
come of the legislative process"). Of course, the judicial process is also subject to these
considerations, though presumably less so. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-
Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9 (1979) (contrasting the personal prefer-
ences that influence legislators with the judiciary's objective search for "true" values);
Michael P. Kenny & Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statutory Construction to Cover the Corporate
Universe: The Misappropriation Theory of Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L. REv. 139, 141 (1995) (observ-
ing that the "words of a statute must necessarily constrain courts when they engage in [the
interpretive] process, otherwise, they simply substitute arbitrary normative expressions of
personal preference for any semblance of legislative intent"); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 411 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (commenting that "[w]e should not allow
our personal preferences as to the wisdom of legislative and congressional action, or our
distaste for such action, to guide ourjudicial decision").
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enactment of anti-discrimination legislation. Thus, beginning with
immutability, Parts N.A. through IV.D. assess the significance of
these factors to parenting.
A. Immutability
Discrimination on the basis of immutable characteristics often
prompts strong societal and judicial condemnation because indi-
viduals have no control over such characteristics.7 5 Compared to
race and sex, the classic examples of immutable traits, parental
status seems highly mutable. To be sure, once a parent, always a
parent. However, construed in terms of the parent's relationship to
minor children, the status of parenthood is not a fixed identity.
Unlike race or sex, which cannot be set aside, individuals can usu-
ally escape whatever negative stereotypes might accompany their
status as parents by the time that their offspring reach the age of
majority. 1 7 In addition, parenthood is frequently a chosen status, or
at the very least, a status subject to individual control.' 77 Hence, at
first glance, treating parenthood as a protected class may seem
odd.
Immutability, however, is not a prerequisite in order for a trait to
warrant inclusion in anti-discrimination statutes. Title VII
illustrates this point. While it protects traits that society deems
immutable (race, color, sex, and national origin), it also prohibits
discrimination on the basis of religion, an arguably alterable
trait. The same observation holds for various state fair
175. See Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CoNsT. L. 646, 673
(2001) ("Few arguments offered on behalf of ending discrimination or inequality resonate
more powerfully than immutability. It reflects the universal appeal of the concept that it is
unfair to disadvantage people based on a characteristic over which they exercise no con-
trol."); Rachel F. Moran, What if Latinos Really Mattered in the Public Policy Debate , 85 CAL. L.
Rav. 1315, 1332 (1997) (commenting that "[a]t its core, corrective justice requires that
workers not be penalized for traits that they cannot change and that are notjob-related").
176. Statutes that prohibit employment discrimination based on parental status ac-
knowledge the degree to which parental bias is linked to the age of children by defining the
status in terms of responsibility for children under the age of eighteen. See supra notes 92-
102 (listing statutes that prohibit parental-status-based employment discrimination).
177. SeeRoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,152-53(1973) (holding that the right to privacy pro-
tects a woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
483 (1965) (holding that the right to privacy protects a married couple's choice to use con-
traception).
178. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980) (observing that under Ti-
tle VII, religion is "a forbidden criterion, even though a matter of individual choice");
Barker v. Taft Broad. Co., 549 F.2d 400, 403 n.3 (6th Cir. 1977) (McCree, J., dissenting)
(commenting that an "employee's religion is certainly not immutable"); see also Mark
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employment laws that extend protection to characteristics that
readily yield to alteration, including marital status and familial
status. 7 9 Likewise, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) provides protection against age-based discrimination, even
though some commentators believe that age " 'is not a discrete and
immutable characteristic of any employee which separates the
members of the protected group indelibly from persons outside
the protected group.'180
In fact, immutability is neither a necessary nor sufficient
condition for a characteristic to merit inclusion in anti-
discrimination statutes. Consider that various immutable
characteristics, such as eye color and height, receive no protection
when they form the basis of employment decisions.'8' In addition,
Strasser, Unconstitutional? Don't Ask; If It Is, Don't Tell: On Deference, Rationality, and the Constitu-
tion, 66 U. CoLo. L. REv. 375, 403 (1995) (observing that "religion is not immutable, neither
in the sense that it is genetic nor in the sense that it is unchangeable (one can convert)").
But see Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 E2d 1231, 1236 (3d Cir. 1977) (categorizing religion as an
"immutable personal characteristic" protected under Title VII); Timothy L. Hall, Religion,
Equality, and Difference, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 62-63 (1992) (discussing the immutability of
religious beliefs); Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic ofAmerican Antidiscrimination
Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1, 8 (2000) (commenting that "American antidiscrimination laws ...
typically prohibit discrimination based upon religion and marital status, even though nether
trait is 'immutable.' ").
179. See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text (referencing state and local em-
ployment statutes that prohibit employment discrimination based on familial status); see also
Nicole Buonocore Porter, Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal For Title VII Protection, 46
WAYNE L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2000) (collecting state statutes that prohibit employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of marital status).
180. Baker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 903 F.2d 1515, 1519 (lth Cir. 1990) (quoting
Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1442 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1005 (1985)); see alsoJanet M. Bowermaster, Two (Federal) Wrongs Make A (State) Right: State
Class-Action Procedures As An Alternative to the Opt-In Class Action Provision of the ADEA, 25 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 7, 40 (1991) (observing that "age discrimination may differ from other
forms of employment discrimination because of the self-corrective aspect of age discrimina-
tion"; aging "is universal-everyone will be old someday"); Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a
Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate Impact Theory Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 74 N.C. L. REv. 267, 307-08 (1995) (commenting that "[a]ge is not an im-
mutable characteristic such as race, sex or national origin, since age changes over time").
But see Howard Eglit, Of Age and the Constitution, 57 CHI-KENT L. REV. 859, 888-89 (1981);
Bryan B. Woodruff, Note, Unprotected Until Forty: The Limited Scope of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 73 IND. L.J. 1295, 1301 (1998) (observing that "for the old, age is an
immutable characteristic, just like race and sex"). The question of whether one regards age
as an immutable trait has occurred against a larger debate regarding whether disparate
impact analysis should apply to age discrimination. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Erica
Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination?: The ADEA's Unnatural Solution,
72 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 780 (1997); Symposium, The AgingAmerican Workforce: Thirty Years under the
Age Discrimination Employment Act, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. (1997).
181. See Eichhorn, supra note 171, at 1075 (noting that "there are many immutable or
nearly immutable characteristics, such as height or left-handedness, that do not incur socie-
tal or legal censure when they become the bases of prejudice").
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even traits deemed highly immutable, like race and sex, are
occasionally the by-product of social construction rather than
biological determinism."' At the end of the day, the mutability of
parental status conveys little probative information to help evaluate
whether parents should be protected from employment
discrimination.
B. History of Discrimination
A more meaningful inquiry asks whether a group has experi-
enced a history of purposeful discrimination based on invidious
stereotypes regarding a trait shared by members of the group. The
most cursory examination of the legislative history of employment
anti-discrimination statutes reveals a strong congressional concern
with combating the effects of past and present discrimination
against disadvantaged groups. Title VII, for example, was enacted
to address a long and shameful history of employment discrimina-
tion, particularly against African-Americans, who for years were
systematically relegated to society's economic fringes..8 Largely
limited to low-skilled and menial jobs, blacks were openly and rou-
tinely discriminated against in all aspects of employment.8 4 A
182. See, e.g., Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition ofDiscrimina-
tion Under Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 772 (1987) (critiquing the "immutability" theory in
the context of employment discrimination); Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Gar-
cia Cousins Lost Their Accents: Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-
Only Rules as the Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 1347, 1367-70 (1997) (describing the mutable-immutable distinction as a "false di-
chotomy"); Dwight J. Davis, 'Garcia v. Gloor': Mutable Characteristics Rationale Extended to
National Origin Discrimination, 32 MERCER L. REV. 1275, 1279-82 (1980) (criticizing mutable-
immutable dichotomy); Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts
Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (1985) (expressing the belief that "the social and psycho-
logical differences between men and women are constructed and mutable, rather than
biologically determined and immutable").
183. See HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: RACE, WORK,
AND THE LAWv 37-162 (1977) (focusing on national socioeconomic policy and employment
discrimination); IRVING KOVARSKY, DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 5-94 (1976) (address-
ing discriminatory employment practices and subsequent legal responses).
184. For historical accounts of how African-Americans were systematically denied em-
ployment opportunities, see HILL, supra note 183; PHILIP S. FONER, ORGANIZED LABOR AND
THE BLACK WORKER 1619-1973 (1974);JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SOR-
ROw: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 179-80 (1985);
BLACK WORKER: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 186
(Philip S. Foner & Ronald L. Lewis eds., 1981); and BLACK WORKER: THE ERA OF POST-WAR
PROSPERITY AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION, 1920-1936 (Philip S. Foner & Ronald L. Lewis
eds., 1980).
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similarly blatant and disturbing record of employment discrimina-
tion existed against women. 15
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)s 6 evinces a compara-
ble concern with America's cruel history of discrimination against
persons with disabilities. 7 "For many years, the nation hid the dis-
abled from public view and confined them to institutions where
they were subjected to inhumane and horrific conditions. When
confronted up close, American society pitied the disabled, de-
meaned their worth, and employed the rule of law to restrain their
integration into mainstream society."88 The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA)s 9 also sought to address a pervasive pat-
tern of discrimination against older workers. While the legislative
history of the ADEA did not document significant workplace ani-
mus against or intolerance of older workers,' 90 it did find that such
workers experienced widespread discrimination based on stereo-
typical and often arbitrary assumptions about their abilities.'9 '
185. For informative historical examinations of employment discrimination against
women, see PHILIP S. FONER, WOMEN AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT: FROM THE
FIRST TRADE UNIONS TO THE PRESENT (1980); JONES, supra note 184; SUSAN ESTABROOK
KENNEDY, IF ALL WE DID WAS To WEEP AT HOME: A HISTORY OF WHITE WORKING-CLASS
WOMEN IN AMERICA (1979); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-
EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (1982).
186. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
187. Congress, in enacting the ADA, found that like racial minorities, "individuals with
disabilities are a discrete and insular minority" who have been "subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our
society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and result-
ing from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such
individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society." 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (7), 2000e-5(f)(1)
(1994).
188. Louis S. Rulli, Symposium, The Americans with Disabilities Act-Past Present and Future:
Developing Law over a Decade: Employment Discrimination Litigation under the ADA from the Perspec-
tive of the Poor: Can the Promise of Title I Be Fulfilled For Low-income Workers in the Next Decade?,
TEMPLE POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 345, 346 (2000).
189. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
634 (1994)).
190. See Michael C. Harper, ADEA Doctrinal Impediments to the Fulfillment of the Wirtz Report
Agenda, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 757, 758-63 (1997) (detailing the findings of the Wirtz Report
on age discrimination). See generally EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AGE DISCRIMINA-
TION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (1981).
191. See Harper, supra note 190, at 758-59; see also 113 CONG. REC. 34,742 (1967)
(statement of Rep. Burke: "Age discrimination is not the same as the insidious discrimina-
tion based on race or creed prejudices and bigotry. These discriminations result in
nonemployment because of feelings about a person entirely unrelated to his ability to do a
job. This is hardly a problem for the olderjobseeker. Discrimination arises for him because
of assumptions that are made about the effects of age on performance."). Of course, as
various scholars increasingly point out, discrimination based on stereotypical assumptions is
a problem not only as regards age but other protected categories as well, such as race and
color; see, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
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In stark contrast to the experiences of these groups, the class of
parents does not exhibit a similar record of workplace discrimina-
tion. There is neither a history of bigotry, stigma, or animus, nor is
there evidence that parents are the victims of pervasive generaliza-
tions that have hindered their employment and their ability to
participate fully in society.1 92 Unlike, for example, historically mar-
ginalized ethnic groups or women, there is no suggestion that
parents, as a group, have been denied a fair share of the economic
pie or that they cannot compete for employment opportunities. 
1 93
Presently, the Fair Housing Act (FHA)194 is the only federal civil
rights statute that prohibits discrimination on the basis of familial
status, which is defined in relationship to minor children. 5 A 1988
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Charles Law-
rence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317
(1987) (discussing prevalence of unconscious racism); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employ-
mentDiscrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458 (2001).
192. To be sure, there is persuasive evidence that women as parents often experience
gender-based discrimination both in the form of deliberate exclusions and as a matter of
unconscious bias. See, e.g., supra notes 12, 35 and 45. However, the record does not support
the existence of discrimination against parents as a group compared to non-parents. See, e.g.,
Demer, supra note 92, at lB (noting that in the past five years, Alaska officials have "found
substantial evidence of discrimination against parents only twice" pursuant to the state's
prohibition against parental-status-based employment discrimination); Bonnie Erbe, Perks for
Dad and Mom, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERV., April 9, 2001 (reporting on study conducted by
the Employment Policy Foundation which found that "'there is simply no evidence that
parents as a group face labor market discrimination'"); Susan Laccetti Meyers, Do Parents
Need Job Protection?, ATLANTA J. & CONSTITUTION, May 1, 1999, at 10A (quoting Professor
Steven Kaminshine of the Georgia State University Law School: "I don't think we can find
state laws that have ostracized on the basis of being a parent"); Mortimer B. Zuckerman,
Piling on the Preferences, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 28, 1999, at 88 (concluding that
"[t] here is no real evidence or history of major discrimination against parents").
193. SeeTimothy Noah, Breeder Blues, Part 2, (CHATrERBOX, SLATE.cOM) (April 21, 1999) at
http://slate.msn.com/code/Chatterbox/Chatterbox.asp?Show- 4/21/1999&idMessage=2619
(last visited Mar. 24, 2002) (evaluating cases documenting incidents of alleged discrimination
against parents cited in support of EDPA and concluding that the cases offer little, if any,
support for the bill).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).
195. The Act defines the term familial status as:
One or more individuals (who have not attained the age of 18 years) being domiciled
with 1) a parent or another person having legal custody of such individual or indi-
viduals; or 2) the designee of such parent or other person having such custody, with
the written permission of such parent or other person.
Id. § 3602(k). The scope of this definition also extends to all individuals who are pregnant
or in the process of securing legal custody of a child. Id.
The other federal civil rights statute that applies to discrimination based on parental re-
sponsibilities is Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994)
(providing that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance"). However, Title IX itself
does not include parenting as an explicit protected category. Instead, the Act's implementing
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amendment to the FHA led to the addition of familial status to the
list of protected categories. 6 The legislative history of that
amendment is instructive in evaluating whether fair employment
laws should also prohibit parental status discrimination. The addi-
tion of family status to the FHA followed on the heels of a
Department of Housing and Urban Development study that
documented pervasive housing discrimination against families with
children. 97 The study found that seventy-five percent of all housing
providers either refused to rent to families with children or im-
posed restrictions on rentals to families with children.'98 Such
discriminatory practices created a "nationwide housing crisis" ' 9
that was particularly devastating to poor families with children.
Lacking the economic means to own their own homes, these fami-
* 200lies relied heavily on the availability of affordable rental units.
When proposals to elevate parenthood to a protected status in the
employment arena are evaluated against these findings, it becomes
clear that there exists scant evidence to indicate that parents suffer
from comparable effects of intentional job discrimination.
C. Job-Relatedness
A third factor that courts frequently focus on is the relation of
the classification to job performance. The moral underpinning of
fair employment laws is that individuals should not be penalized
for personal traits that correlate weakly, if at all, with legitimate
regulations provide that Title IX's prohibition against sex discrimination expressly applies to
parent status: "A recipient [of federal funds] shall not apply any rule concerning a student's
actual or potential parental, family, or marital status which treats students differently on the basis
of sex." 34 C.F.R. § 106.40(a) (1996).
196. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(b)(2), 102 Stat.
1619, 1622 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1994)).
197. See Edward Allen, Six Years After Passage of the Fair Housing Amendments Act: Discrimi-
nation Against Families with Children, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 297, 300-10 (1995) (examining the
legislative history behind the inclusion of familial status in the FHA); James A. Kushner,
Symposium: The State of The Union: Civil Rights: The Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 VAND. L.
REv. 1049 (1989); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-711 at 19-21 (1988) (detailing pervasive dis-
crimination against families with children and noting that the few existing state laws were
ineffective at eliminating this discrimination).
198. Allen, supra note 197, at 300.
199. Id. at 301 (quoting 134 CONG. REc. H4612 (daily ed. June 22, 1988) (statement of
Rep. Miller)).
200. Id.
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business considerations."' For example, racial identity is rarely
relevant to one's ability to perform a job. Employer reliance on
characteristics such as race and gender as job qualification proxies
typically reflect irrational and suspect assumptions about the dif-
ferential worth of individuals solely because of their group
affiliation. °2
Yet, while racial and gender traits are more likely than not ille-
gitimate anchors on which to ground employment decisions, one
can readily imagine circumstances that may lead an employer to
classify workers according to their parental status. Employers fre-
quently require employees to be able to work long hours, to work
nights, to work weekends, to travel frequently, or to be on call at
odd hours. While some employers simply assume that an em-
ployee's status as a parent will interfere with his or her job
performance, it is not irrational to think that employees with chil-
dren are less willing or able to put in long hours relative to
co-workers who do not have children.
Consider a hospital in search of employees who have sufficient
flexibility to be on-call during the evening hours, and who can re-
port to the hospital within twenty minutes in case of an emergency.
To be sure, many individuals with parental obligations could satisfy
these requirements. Yet, the hospital may find it efficient to use
parental status as a basis for selecting employees by screening out
all applicants who have young children. Unlike statistical discrimi-
nation based on race, which creates inefficiencies over the long
201. See Sujit Choudhry, Distribution vs. Recognition: the Case of Anti-discrimination Laws, 9
GEO. MASON L. REV. 145, 152-53 (2000) (observing that "discrimination is unjust because its
purpose is to deny persons access to a material good or opportunity on the basis of reasons
that are irrelevant to the distribution of that material good or opportunity"); see also CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 339 (1993), where the author articulates an anti-
caste principle that:
[d]ifferences that are irrelevant from the moral point of view ought not without good
reason to be turned, by social and legal structures, into social disadvantages. They
certainly should not be permitted to do so if the disadvantage is systemic .... [oper-
ating] along standard and predictable lines in multiple important spheres of life, and
applies in realms that relate to basic participation as a citizen in a democracy.
Id.
202. See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1, 7 (1976):
The antidiscrimination principle fills a special need because-as even a glance at his-
tory indicates-race-dependent decisions that are rational and purport to be based
solely on legitimate considerations are likely in fact to rest on assumptions of the dif-
ferential worth of racial groups or on the related phenomenon of racially selective
sympathy and indifference.
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run,20 3 there is no reason to believe that the same inefficiencies will
occur with generalizations premised on parental status. The reality
is that parental status correlates with job performance far more
strongly than do other personal attributes that are subject to em-
ployment anti-discrimination legislation. Work and child rearing
frequently clash, and when they do, the amount of time that indi-
viduals have available to devote to work often diminishes. This
observation is not an endorsement of the status quo. Strategies
must be pursued that will enable workers to forge a viable bond
between work and parenting. However, treating parenthood as a
protected class is neither a promising strategy nor is it one that
bears much resemblance to the original aims of employment dis-
crimination law.
D. Political Power
An additional factor relevant to determining whether a group
requires government protection from discrimination is the group's
political power. Judicial concern with political power addresses
whether a group, faced with undesirable state action, can effec-
tively use the political process to protect its interests. Absent that
ability, the group may need special judicial protection by way of
heightened scrutiny of government classifications that discriminate
against group members. °4 A similar notion often informs the in-
quiry as to whether groups require extraordinary congressional
solicitude to protect their interests from the discriminatory acts of
private parties or local governments. For example, passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 evinced congressional recognition of the
fact that blacks lacked the political power to defend against the
pervasive racism of both private entities as well as local public enti-
ties.05 Congress articulated a similar awareness in the context of
203. See Owen Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 237 (1971)
(observing that, in the employment context, criteria such as race or color "impair rather
than advance productivity and wealth maximization for the individual businessman and for
society as a whole").
204. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1937) (leaving
open the question of whether a heightened form ofjudicial scrutiny is warranted to protect
a group that lacks political power). See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (arguing in favor of judicial protection of groups
likely to be denied political power in a majoritarian regime).
205. For accounts of the legislative history of Title VII, see HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY (1990); Herbert Hill,
Black Workers, Organized Labor and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act: Legislative History and
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the ADA, concluding that like racial minorities, individuals with
disabilities have been "relegated to a position of political power-
lessness in our society.
20 6
Against this background, the question is straightforward: Assum-
ing workers encounter invidious employment discrimination on
the basis of parental status, do they lack the requisite political
power to obtain relief from local and state governments? Is there a
role for the federal government to play regarding employment dis-
crimination against parents? The short answer to both questions is
no. There is no basis for thinking that parents, as a group, have
been excluded from political and economic power. On the con-
trary, the political process has yielded considerable benefits for
individuals with parental obligations, including tax breaks,0 7 edu-
cational subsidies, and family-friendly employment legislation
such as the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).09
Of course, some may argue that even though the class of parents
does not resemble groups that have traditionally garnered federal
protection against employment discrimination, prohibiting dis-
crimination based on parental status may still serve a useful
symbolic value in expressing society's commitment to the role of
parenting. Yet, while this symbolism may be worthy, the costs of
achieving it via an anti-discrimination framework may be too high.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the
agency that is responsible for administering federal fair employ-
ment statutes, has very limited enforcement resources. At present,
the agency is "spread six miles wide and an inch deep,"10 trying
Litigation Record, in RACE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 263, 263 (Herbert Hill
& James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993); CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST
DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985). See generally
UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1968).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (7) (1994).
207. See 26 U.S.C. § 21 (2001) (Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit); see also Sharon
C. Nantell, The Tax Paradigm of Child Care: Shifting Attitudes Toward a Private Public Parental
Alliance, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 883 (1997); Ann E Thomas, Child Care and Federal Tax Policy, 16
N.Y.L. SCH.J. HuM. RTS. 203 (1999).
208. See NinaJ. Crimm, Core Societal Values Deserve Federal Aid: Schools, Tax Credits, and the
Establishment Clause, 34 GA. L. REV. 1 (1999) (discussing educational benefits provided to
individuals with children); Stephen G. Gilles, Selective Funding of Education: An Epsteinian
Analysis, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 745, 769 (2000) (evaluating educational subsidies to parents
in the form of vouchers or tax benefits).
209. See infra Part V.A. (discussing the FMLA).
210. Oversight Hearing on the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Before the
Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 105th Cong. 178 (1997) (statement of Richard T Sey-
mour, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law) (quoted in Dorothy E. Larkin, Note,
Participation Anxiety: Should Title VI's Participation Clause Protect Employees Participating in Inter-
nal Investigations, 33 GA. L. REV. 1181, 1214 (1999)).
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desperately to make a noticeable dent in an enormous backlog of
cases. 2 1 Lacking adequate staff and resources, and faced with thou-
sands of new complaints each year, the EEOC is currently unable
to respond effectively to the many complaints it receives each213
year. In light of this situation, it seems unwise to pursue a meas-
ure for symbolic value and, in the process, run the risk of further
diluting the EEOC's efforts to vindicate the goals of Title VII, the
ADEA, and the ADA. Moreover, given the practical constraints fac-
ing the EEOC, a prohibition against parental status discrimination
would benefit primarily those employees with the financial re-
sources to bring and finance a private lawsuit.211 Consequently,
legislation like EDPA would have little, if any, practical utility for
low-income workers who may experience parental-status-based
discrimination.
211. See EEOC Struggles with Caseload, 45 LAB. L.J. 432 (1994); EEOC Inventory Grows to
92,000 Pending Charges, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 174, at D5 (Sept. 12, 1994); Peter T
Kilborn, Backlog of Cases Is OverwhelmingJobs-Bias Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1994, at 1.
212. See Kristin Downey Grimsley, EEOC Chief Voices Frustration Over Case Backlog, Budget
Cuts, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1996, at A4 (reporting that the EEOC received approximately
88,000 complaints of illegal discrimination in 1995, a figure representing a forty-two percent
increase from the 1990 caseload); John Montoya, New Priorities far the '90s, 42 HR MAG. 118
(1997) (reporting that the EEOC backlog of cases grew "to about 100,000 by the end of
fiscal year 1995").
213. See Lewis Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 60 (1998) (observing that the EEOC backlog has resulted in the
EEOC taking up to two years in some cases to initiate an investigation); J. Clay Smith, Jr.,
Open Letter to the President on Race and Affirmative Action, 42 How. L.J. 27, 44 (1998) (observ-
ing that "increasing numbers of cases filed by the EEOC and private parties are being lost in
court and languishing in filing cabinets"); EEOC Backlog of Discrimination Cases Leads to Greater
Use of Right-to-Sue Letters, EMPL. POL. & L. DAILY (BNA) D6, at 16 (Sept. 30, 1996).
214. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination
Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 395, 458 (1999) (observing that "EEOC and group suits are
less significant today, and the private litigant's individual cause of action is now the main
vehicle to pursue the public goal," and commenting that the costs of private litigation ex-
cludes some claimants); see also Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 E3d 354, 360 (7th Cir.
1997) (observing that "because the [EEOC] has an enormous backlog and limited resources
for litigating, the vast majority of workers who have claims under any of the statutes that the
Commission enforces have perforce to bring and finance their own lawsuits; they cannot
rely on the Commission to do so for them").
Note that Section 706(0(1) of Title VII expressly grants individuals a private right of action
against employers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994). Section 706(0 (1) provides that the person
claiming to be aggrieved may file a private suit after the EEOC has dismissed the charge or if,
within 180 days from the filing of the charges, the EEOC has not pursued a suit against the em-
ployer or reached a conciliation agreement. Id.; see also Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 45 (1974) ("[T]he private right of action remains an essential means of obtaining judi-
cial enforcement of Title VII .... In such cases, the private litigant not only redresses his own
injury but also vindicates the important congressional policy against discriminatory employment
practices.").
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Still, the argument remains that as a matter of basic fairness, an
employer should not compromise the employment opportunities
of workers simply because of their status as parents. While I share
this sentiment, I hasten to add that when working parents are sub-
ject to discriminatory treatment, their situation parallels that of
countless employees-at-will who believe that they have been treated
215i
unfairly but who have little, if any, legal recourse. Like many
commentators critical of the employment-at-will doctrine,2 6 I be-
lieve that the doctrine has outlived its usefulness and that a "good
cause" standard should govern modern employment relationships.
Consequently, if individuals require protection from the adverse
consequences of parental bias in the workplace, they should be
afforded claims predicated on judicial or legislative notions of
good cause, 27 not employment discrimination law.
215. See supra note 153 (defining the employment-at-will doctrine).
216. The literature criticizing the employment-at-will doctrine is voluminous. See, e.g.,
MATTHEW W. FINKIN ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE 284-86
(1989) (discussing specific anti-retaliation laws and general "whistleblower laws"); Robert M.
Bastres, A Synthesis and a Proposalfor Reform of theEmployment At-Will Doctrine, 90 W. VA. L. REV.
319, 346-50 (1988) (arguing that at-will rule should be discarded and replaced with just-
cause protection); Larry Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLuM. L. REV. 1404 (1967) (advancing the creation of
a tort remedy to protect employees from unjust employment dismissals); David Dominguez,
Just Cause Protection: Will the Demise of Employment at Will Breathe New Life into Collective Job Secu-
rity?, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 283 (1992) (supporting the adoption of a statutory just cause
standard instead of employment-at-will); Peter Linzer, TheDecline of Assent: At-Will Employment
as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323 (1986);Jack Stieber
& Michael Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: the Need for a Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 319 (1983); Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal:
Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 493 (1976) (discussing need for statutes to remedy
arbitrary or malicious discharges and reviewing history of at-will doctrine).
Those articles have been countered by commentators who insist that the doctrine re-
mains worthwhile and should not be abandoned. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the
Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 951 (1984) (arguing that at-will rule maximizes eco-
nomic efficiency in employment); Lary S. Larson, Why We Should Not Abandon the Presumption
That Employment Is Terminable At-Will, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 219, 219 (1987) (suggesting that it
may be premature to abandon the termination at-will rule); Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data,
Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1901, 1923
(1996) (evaluating common criticisms of the employment at-will doctrine and concluding
that the doctrine "allow[s] individuals freedom to find employment situations which more
closely approximate their preferences"); Richard W. Power, A Defense of the Employment At Will
Rule, 27 ST. Louis U. L.J. 881, 899 (1983) (suggesting that adopting just-cause rule would
subject employers to voluminous record keeping);J. HoultVerkerke, An Empirical Perspective
on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 837,
842 (arguing that courts and legislatures "should reject mandatory rules and reaffirm the at
will default").
217. Proposals to enact good cause employment standards are generally dubbed wrong-
ful discharge legislation. The effect of such legislation is typically to prohibit employers from
discharging employees absent good cause. My decision to refer to the standard as a good
cause standard as opposed to a wrongful discharge standard reflects a belief that a require-
ment of good cause should extend to any employment disciplinary action, and not be
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V. AN ALTERNATIVE STATUTORY APPROACH
Although in this Article I have argued against treating parents as
a protected class, I am sympathetic to the concerns prompting
proposals for such treatment. Many employees with parental obli-
gations confront constant obstacles trying to manage the often
competing demands of home and work. As suggested earlier,8
creating a framework that can support working parents requires a
departure from the traditional anti-discrimination model of Title
VII and its insistence on symmetry. This Part begins by briefly
commenting on the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),21'
which marks such a departure by providing workers with concrete
benefits as opposed to simply prohibiting discrimination. 220 Al-
though the FMLA is not without flaws, it offers a useful framework
for thinking about how to empower working parents in a manner
that avoids false comparisons between parents and groups pres-
ently protected by employment anti-discrimination legislation. The
second half of this Part surveys strategies to further the FMLA's vi-
sion of insuring that "American workers will no longer have to
choose between the job they need and the family they love."2 '
limited solely to discharge. While most courts allow exceptions to the employment-at-will
doctrine only for discharge, some courts have taken a more liberal approach, extending
exceptions to other forms of employer discipline, such as demotions and suspensions. See,
e.g., Mack v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter, 880 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (stat-
ing that the public policy exception covers "employee demotions as well as employee
terminations"); Zimmerman v. Buccheit of Sparta, 615 N.E.2d 791, 793 (Il. App. Ct. 1993),
rev'd, 645 N.E.2d 877 (I11. 1994) (concluding that there is "little difference" between termi-
nations and demotions). See generally Gregory Mark Munson, Note, A Straitjacket for
Employment At-Will: Recognizing Breach of Implied Contract Actions for Wrongful Demotion, 50
VAND. L. REV. 1577 (1997).
218. See supra Section III (examining the limitations of anti-discrimination doctrine to
eliminate work/family conflicts and suggesting prerequisites for an alternative model).
219. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
220. See Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating
the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2154, 2189 (1994) (describing the FMLA as
"[a]n alternative statutory model that seeks to provide actual benefits rather than simply to
prohibit discrimination").
221. Statement of President Clinton on Signing the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 1
PuB. PAPERS 50 (Feb. 5, 1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 54, 54.
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A. The Family & Medical Leave Act
In passing the FMLA, Congress was particularly concerned with
eliminating workplace discrimination against women who were vic-
timized by virtue of being parents with primary child care
responsibilities.22 However, as enacted, the FMLA functions in a
manner that is different from anti-discrimination statutes. Under
traditional anti-discrimination statutes, like Tide VII or the pro-
posed parental-status-based discrimination statute, employers have
a duty to refrain from discriminating against employees based on a
particular characteristic (race, sex, parental status, etc.), but no af-
firmative duty to accommodate the needs of employees. 23
In sharp contrast, the FMLA imposes upon employers an af-
firmative duty to help workers harmonize work and family.
2 4
Indeed, properly understood, the FMLA is not an anti-
discrimination statute but a labor standard statute similar to the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).2 5 Like the FLSA, the FMLA in-
sures that workers receive a base level entitlement. The Act
requires employers to accommodate certain familial obligations of
employees by providing eligible employees with up to twelve weeks
222. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (b) (4) (1994) (including among stated purposes of the FMLA
the goal of "minimiz[ing] the potential for employment discrimination on the basis of sex
by ensuring generally that leave is available for eligible medical reasons (including mater-
nity-related disability) and for compelling family reasons, on a gender-neutral basis").
223. Title VII actually does contain a notable exception to the traditional anti-
discrimination approach; namely, the Act requires employers to accommodate the religious
interests of employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994). Title VI's religious accommodation
provision was added via a 1972 amendment and provides that:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well
as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommo-
date to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.
Id.; see also Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to Title VII
and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 719, 742 (1996):
The normal duty under Title VII is not to treat employees differently in an adverse
manner based on the listed characteristics. But, as a result of the amendment, an
employer has an affirmative duty to treat certain employees differently, and some
would argue favorably, by accommodating their religious needs. Thus an employer
has a duty to discriminate in favor of certain employees by granting an employee spe-
cial treatment because of the employee's religious practices, that is, to accommodate
the employee's special religious needs.
224. See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text (describing duties that the FMLA
imposes on employers).
225. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994) (establishing minimum wage and hour standards).
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of unpaid leave per year. Leave must be made available for the
birth or adoption of a child or for a serious health condition that
27affects the employee or a covered family member. Upon return-
ing to work from an FMLA leave, an employee has the right to be
restored to the same job, or an equivalent position to the one held
by the employee.2 s
To be sure, the FMLA is not without serious deficiencies.
Importantly, the Act mandates unpaid leave only, a fact that leads
many employees to forego taking time off because they cannot
afford the wage loss.2 30 The Act is further limited by its narrow
application to serious medical conditions, s1  providing no
protection for the many routine parental obligations and
22
exigencies that most commonly clash with work demands. These
226. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (1994).
227. Id.; 28 C.F.R. § 825.112(a)(1)-(3) (1997).
228. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a); 28 C.F.R. § 825.100(c). To insure the availability of these sub-
stantive guarantees, the Act also imposes upon employers a negative duty, i.e., a duty not to
discriminate against an employee for exercising his or rights pursuant to the FMLA. See 29
U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) ("It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or
deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter.");
id. § 2615(a) (2) ("It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner
discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful [under the
FMLA].").
229. For examples of articles critical of the FMLA, see Ruth Colker, Hypercapitalism: Af-
firmative Protections for People with Disabilities, Illness, and Parenting Responsibilities Under United
States Law, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 213, 239-50 (1997) (evaluating the FMLA and conclud-
ing that it has "provided little job security for many employees in the workplace")
[hereinafter Colker, Hypercapitalism]; Cristina Duarte, The Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993: Paying the Price for an Imperfect Solution, 32 U. LOUISVILLEJ. FAM. L. 833, 834 (1994)
(observing that the FMLA "will not provide relief to those families who most desperately
need relief"); Eichner, supra note 12, at 133 (discussing the limitations of the FMLA); Angie
K. Young, Assessing the Family and Medical Leave Act in Terms of Gender Equality, Work/Family
Balance, and the Needs of Children, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113, 140 (1998) (assessing the
merits of the FMLA and concluding that while it is a "step in the right direction in terms of
recognizing the work/family conflict, its provisions are meager").
230. See COMMITTEE ON FAMILY & MED. LEAVE, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BALANCING THE
NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS (2000); see also Ruth Colker, Pregnancy, Parenting, and
Capitalism, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 61, 62 (1997) (observing that the FMLA "provides few genuine
options for the overwhelming number of poor, or even middle-class women, who cannot
afford to take unpaid leave and still pay the bills"); Jim Williams, Building on Ed Sparer's Leg-
acy: Redefining Legal Advocacy For Low-income People, 66 BROOKLYN L. REV. 153, 161 (2000)
(stating that "[t]he vast majority of people cannot take leave because they cannot afford
to").
231. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (1994) (providing leave for "serious health condi-
tions"); see also 29 C.ER. § 825.114 (1999) (defining "serious health condition" as one that
requires hospitalization or period of incapacitation exceeding three days and that excludes
ordinary conditions such as flu, ulcers, and upset stomach).
232. See HEYMANN, THE WIDENING GAP, supra note 1, at 30 ("Most of the reasons
parents needed to take leave from work to help school-age children were covered neither by
the FMLA nor by existing programs serving school-age children."); S. Jody Heymann et al.,
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limitations notwithstanding, the FMLA represents a critical turning
point in strategies to address the discriminatory effects of
work/family conflicts. The Act recognizes that positive action is
required in order to minimize the likelihood that work/family
conflicts will trigger discrimination against workers with child care
obligations.
In addition, the accommodation approach of the FMLA avoids
some of the inapt comparisons associated with efforts to treat
parents as a protected class. As part of its goal of ensuring equal
employment opportunities, anti-discrimination doctrine has
functioned traditionally to counter the stigmatic harm and the
presumption of inferiority that frequently accompanies
discrimination. Discrimination premised on traits such as race and
gender, for example, perpetuates demeaning stereotypes and
reinforces notions of racial and gender superiority on the part of
233whites and men. By comparison, discrimination based on
parenthood does not foster oppression nor does it generate
feelings of superiority in the minds of individuals without
children.234 To treat parents as a protected class is to belittle the
very notion of invidious discrimination and to minimize the
experiences of those groups that have been disadvantaged in the
workplace by harmful misconceptions and prejudice.
In contrast, the message sent by an accommodation approach,
such as that embodied in the FMLA, is not that parents have en-
dured stigmatizing oppression and irrational prejudice but that
Parental Availability for the Care of Sick Children, 98 AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS 226 (1996)
(concluding that "the FMLA does not address the majority of children's sick care needs");
see also Colker, Hypercapitalism, supra note 229, at 240 (observing that judicial interpretations
of "serious health condition" have excluded "many of the health conditions that cause many
parents to miss work to care for their children").
233. See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences,
Stereot4pes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 149 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, TheAnticaste Principle, 92
MICH. L. REv. 2410 (1994).
234. Indeed,just the opposite seems true; namely, childless individuals are often regarded
as inferior because they have no children. See CAROLYN MORELL, UNWOMANLY CONDUCT: THE
CHALLENGES OF INTENTIONAL CHILDLESSNESS 77 (1994) (noting how the equation of family
with children disregards the experiences of individuals without children: "In common dis-
course it is the act of having children which defines the family" and "[w]hile 'single-parent
family' is a common term, we hear little of 'no child family' "); ELLEN PECK, PRONATALISM: THE
MYTH OF MOM AND APPLE PIE 250 (1974). Such perceptions are particularly pernicious for
women without children for whom childlessness is regarded as a "condition" that alternately
invites suspicion or pity from strangers. See LAURIE LISLE, WITHOUT CHILD: CHALLENGING THE
STIGMA OF CHILDLESSNESS 235 (1999) (observing that "[a]s long as a female is young and
unmarried, her childlessness is unquestioned, even honored, since she represents the virgin
archetype. When it is a matter of considered choice, however, the reaction is often different.
The attractive lover of man, the Aphrodite or mistress type, is usually tolerated. But a nullipara
who is old, isolated, or angry, or who is not sexual or maternal, runs the risk of being regarded
as an anti-mother or an imperfect male and being cast out of the human family").
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they, like most workers, face considerable difficulties trying to bal-
ance the competing demands of work and family.2ss To the extent
that the FMLA addresses harmful stereotypes, it does so in connec-
tion with gendered norms and assumptions that have
disadvantaged the class of women as primary caretakers, not the
236
class of parents. In the end, an accommodation model, as com-
pared to a parental status discrimination paradigm, is both better
suited to make a real difference in the lives of working parents, and
it constitutes a more principled solution to work-parenting con-
flicts. As importantly, the entitlement structure of an
accommodation model stands to benefit all covered workers, and
not just those who have the financial resources to pursue a dis-
crimination action.237
B. Looking Forward
The challenge that lies ahead is developing work/family strate-
gies that can strengthen the FMLA and restructure the workplace
so as to value caregiving. Key suggestions to improve the FMLA are
providing for paid leave;238 lengthening the period of leave beyond
twelve weeks;239 and extending coverage to more workers.2 40 These
235. See Marion Crain, "Where Have all the Cowboys Gone?". Marriage and Breadwinning in
Postindustrial Society, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1877, 1952 (2000) (citing evidence indicating that "work-
family balance issues are a pressing concern for the vast majority of employees"); Mary Young,
Work-Family Backlash: Begging the Question, What's Fair?, 562 ANNALS 32, 34 (1999) (reporting on
a study which found that even as "44 percent of respondents did not have children, 88 percent
agreed that work and personal life responsibilities sometimes conflicted with each other" and
concluding that "[t]hese findings suggest that work-life conflicts are not restricted to a specific
employee population but are widespread").
236. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (b) (4) (including among stated purposes of the FMLA the goal
of "minimiz[ing] the potential for employment discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring
generally that leave is available for eligible medical reasons (including maternity-related dis-
ability) and for compelling family reasons, on a gender neutral basis").
237. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text (observing that because of the major
resource constraints on the EEOC, only individuals with financial resources to sustain a private
lawsuit against an employer would actually benefit from a federal law prohibiting discrimina-
tion against parents).
238. See Michael Selmi, The Limited Vision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 44 VILL. L.
REV. 395 (1999); Marc Mory & Lia Pistilli, Note, The Failure of the Family and Medical Leave Act:
Alternative Proposals for Contemporary American Families, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 689 (2001)
(discussing needed improvements in the FMLA, including provisions for paid leave and
greater leave time).
239. Mory & Pistilli, supra note 238, at 707-08.
240. The Act only covers employers with fifty or more employees. 29 U.S.C.
§ 2611(4) (A) (i). In addition, an employee must have worked for his or her employer for at
least one year and at least 1250 hours during the previous twelve months in order to qualify for
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recommended changes should be accompanied by measures to
restructure the workplace so as to allow for flexible work/family
arrangements that can promote parenting as a social good.
Importantly, studies indicate that many working parents lack the
requisite workplace flexibility to attend to routine child care de-
mands241 such as parent-teacher conferences, staying home with a
sick child, 42 taking a child for routine medical and dental visits,
and caring for a child when child care arrangements unexpectedly
fail. When these responsibilities conflict with work requirements,
employees can find themselves having to choose between their jobs
and the welfare of their children. 43 To minimize the occurrence of
these hard choices, strategies must be pursued that afford individuals
sufficient workplace flexibility. For example, the FMLA could be
amended to allow workers a certain number of hours per year to re-
spond to routine work/family conflicts. 244 A different approach would
leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(a)(1)-(2) (1999). These two restrictions together operate to deny
FMLA coverage to approximately 41 million private-sector workers. See, e.g., Melissa A. Childs,
The Changing Face of Unions: What Women Want From Employers, 12 DEPAUL Bus. LJ. 381,426-27
(1999); see also C. John Tysse & Kimberly L. Japinga, The Federal Family and Medical Leave Act:
Easily Conceived, Difficult Birth, Enigmatic Child, 27 CREIGHTON L. REv. 361, 361-62 (1994) (es-
timating that the FMLA does not cover "approximately ninety-five percent of all businesses and
from forty to fifty percent of all United States employees").
Recent proposed measures to expand coverage of the FMLA include the Family and
Medical Leave Fairness Act of 2001, H.R. 265, 107th Cong. § 511 (2001) (amending the
FMLA to extend coverage to employees at worksites where the employer employs at least
twenty-five employees at the worksite and within seventy-five miles of that worksite) and the
Family and Medical Leave Fairness Act of 2001, S. 18, 107th Cong. § 511 (2001) (same).
241. SeeHEYMANN, THE WIDENING GAP, supra note ].
242. The FMLA does not cover routine illnesses such as the common cold, the flu, ear-
aches, and upset stomachs. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (providing leave for "serious
health conditions"); see also Eichner, supra note 12, at 142 (observing that the FMLA does
not "meet the needs of sick-but-not-deathly-ill children. [It] does not entitle a parent to take
a day off, paid or unpaid, to care for a child with the chicken pox or to take a child to a
doctor's appointment."). According to Jody Heymann, the children's illnesses that most
require parents to miss work are those that are not covered by the FMLA. HEYMANN, THE
WIDENING GAP, supra note 1, at 24.
243. See Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of Work-
Family Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 47 Wisc. L. REv. 1443 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations] (discussing negative impact of work-
parenting conflicts on employees).
244. In 1997, President Clinton urged Congress to expand the FMLA so as to allow em-
ployees up to twenty-four hours per year for leave to attend parent/teacher conferences or
to accompany a child, spouse, or elderly parent on a medical or dental visit. See Stanley
Meisler, Clinton Seeks to Expand Law on Family Leave, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1997, at 1; Sandra
Sobieraj, Clinton Pushes to Expand Family Leave, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, April 13,
1997, at A2. In the ensuing years, lawmakers have introduced a number of "parental in-
volvement" bills in Congress. See The Time for Schools Act of 2001, H.R. 265, 107th Cong.
(2001) (amending the FMLA to allow employees up to twenty-four hours, during any twelve-
month period, "to participate in: an academic activity of [their child's] school, such as a
parent-teacher conference or an interview for a school or ... literacy training under a family
literacy program"); The Time for Schools Act of 2001, S. 18, 107th Cong. (2001) (same).
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require employers to accommodate work/family conflicts if the ac-
commodation can be achieved without imposing an undue hardship
on the employer's business. Finally, if as a society we are truly com-
mitted to restructuring the workplace to better accommodate
familial needs, then serious attention must be accorded to proposals
to reduce the work week,46 which would enable all workers more
time to attend to family obligations and household demands without
fear of adverse employment consequences.
CONCLUSION
In today's workplace, it is clear that employees with parental
obligations require assistance to fulfill the demands of both work
and parenting. In this Article, I have argued that treating
parenthood as a protected category in employment discrimination
statutes might advance the interests of a few workers with parental
obligations, but that such an approach ultimately achieves only
a marginal improvement over the ability of a gender
Presently, several states provide workers with protected leave to participate in educational
activities involving their children. Louisiana, for example, provides eligible employees up to
sixteen hours of leave during any twelve-month period "to attend, observe, or participate in
conferences or classroom activities" that are conducted at his or her child's school or day
care center, if activities cannot reasonably be scheduled during non-work hours. LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 23:1015.2 (West 2000) ("School and day care conference and activities leave");
see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.8(a) (1) (West 2001) (mandating that an employee can take off
"up to 40 hours each year, not exceeding eight hours in any calendar month of the year, to
participate in activities of the school or licensed child day care facility of any of his or her
children"); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 52D (Law Coop. 2001); MINN. STAT. § 181.9412
(West 2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.490 (Michie 2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472a
(2001). A few states also allow employees leave for medical needs that are not covered by the
FMLA. For example, Massachusetts family and medical leave statute provides an employee
twenty-four hours of leave during any twelve-month period, in addition to leave available
under the FMLA, to accompany his or her child to routine medical or dental appointments,
such as check-ups or vaccinations. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 149, § 52D(b) (2) (Law Coop. 2001);
see also OR. REV. STAT. § 659.478 (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472a (2001).
245. See Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations, supra note 243 (borrowing
from Title VII's religious accommodation framework to advance a model of accommodation
for routine parental obligations).
246. Much of the present discussion on the need to shorten the work week was
prompted by Juliet Schor's work concluding that after a century-long decline in work hours,
Americans are now working more. SeeJULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICANS: THE
UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE (1991); see also Crain, supra note 235, at 1944-49 (rec-
ommending a shorter work week); Jerry A. Jacobs & Kathleen Gerson, 7bward a Family-
Friendly, Gender-Equitable Work Week, 1 U. PA.J. LAB. & EMP. L. 457,469 (1998) (discussing the
advantages of a shorter work week); Vicki Schultz, Life's Work 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1881, 1957
(2000) (recommending an amendment to the FLSA to reduce the workweek to thirty or
thirty-five hours).
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anti-discrimination model to alleviate discrimination based on
parental status. Equipping parents with civil rights to combat
workplace discrimination is simply no solution for a lack of time
and resources. As one commentator remarked, "[a] 11 the 'rights' in
the world [cannot] help when you have to get your toddler on a
bus at 5:30 a.m. so you can get her to her substandard day care in
time to get to your own job cleaning hotels by 7:30.",247 Employees
with parental obligations need more time to devote to child care
activities and greater resources to enhance those activities.
Expanding the scope of anti-discrimination legislation to in-
clude parents is not only an inadequate means of helping workers
strike an acceptable balance between work and parenting; the
strategy also bears little semblance to the goals and purposes of
equal employment opportunity legislation. In contrast to other
groups that have gained federal protection against employment
discrimination, there exists no sound basis for protecting parents.
Instead of devoting precious resources to a largely symbolic anti-
discrimination measure, attention should focus on strategies that
can accommodate the parenting needs of workers.
247. Majorie Williams, Parenthood Without Punishment, WASH. POST, May 5, 2000, at A27.
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